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Introduction and summary
This thesis is a detailed study of the first attempt by a certain public sector organisation 
(here referred to as “the Organisation”) to follow a formal information technology (IT) 
strategic planning process and develop its own Information Technology Strategic Plan 
(ITSP). IT strategic planning is taken to include planning for information systems, 
information architecture, IT resources, IT infrastructure and telecommunications. The main 
aim of the thesis is to interpret the ITSP process as it occurred within the Organisation. A 
subsidiary aim is to contribute to a better understanding of the ITSP process in general.
The research adopted the case study technique to investigate the structures, processes, 
values and relationships which existed within the Organisation. The study asked the 
questions:
. Why was ITSP undertaken by the Organisation?
. How was it attempted?
. How and why was it opposed?
. Why did it apparently fail?
The research approach drew on anthropological methods, which have value in investigating 
social and cultural contexts. Detailed study within the Organisation was carried out using 
the main research method of cultural anthropology, participant observation. A key concept 
based on anthropology - organisational culture - was also utilised to help interpret the ITSP 
process.
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The approaches taken by organisations to their strategic planning have been seen to be 
divided into two main types - “rational” and “processual”. The rational approach usually 
involves top-down, analytical techniques. The processual approach to strategy formation 
acknowledges that successful strategies are just as likely to emerge from the “grass roots” 
of an organisation as they are to be systematically planned and imposed from the top.
It is concluded that the overall ITSP process within the Organisation and its outcome can 
be best understood not as a rational strategy, but as an emergent process which was shaped 
by the cultural values and understandings which applied at the “grass roots” of the 
organisation. It is demonstrated that the ITSP process was significantly influenced by the 
IT governance framework which applied within the Organisation. The most influential 
features of the IT governance framework were its implicit, as opposed to its more openly 
acknowledged aspects, which in practice had less influence. It is shown that the implicit IT 
governance framework was itself shaped substantially by the organisational culture and 
structure, which in turn were significantly influenced by the history of the Organisation.
In general, it is shown that organisational history, structure and culture can influence one 
another to form a triad, which can shape another triad consisting of IT governance, 
information systems and IT strategy. These in turn can influence one another, and can also 
reinforce the precepts of the organisational culture and structure. It is shown that this model 
applied within the context of the Organisation.
Although from one perspective the ITSP process undertaken by the Organisation might be 
seen as a “failure” - it was ultimately abandoned - the actual process and its outcomes 
appeared logical and made good sense to most participants within the context of the IT 
governance and the organisational culture.
/ /
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Plan of the thesis
The thesis is structured in four main parts.
Part 1 outlines the aims of the research, and the research design and techniques adopted. 
The initial research design is described in terms of its main attributes: the questions asked, 
the propositions put forward, the unit of analysis, the logic linking the data to be collected 
to the propositions, and the criteria for interpreting the findings. The case study approach 
adopted is also summarised.
Part 2 identifies and discusses the particular theoretical approaches and areas of the 
literature which are relevant to the interpretation of the ITSP process studied. These 
comprise strategic management and planning, IT strategic planning, anthropological 
concepts and IT governance. The relevant anthropological concepts include organisational 
culture and symbolism, and the technique of participant observation.
Part 3 is a detailed examination of the case study itself. The research setting is described 
in depth, along with the participant observation approach used. The internal culture of the 
Organisation and its associated symbolism are discussed. Strategic management planning 
within the Organisation is outlined and analysed, followed by the related issue of internal 
communication. Information technology in the Organisation is then described and critically 
analysed under the headings of IT service provision, IT governance, information systems, 
the IT section, the IT manager, a key earlier IT project and IT strategic planning. The 
approach to ITSP taken by the Organisation is then analysed further in terms of client/server 
computing, client/server computing as an Organisation strategy, the further development of 
the IT strategic plan, and the outcomes of the ITSP process. Part 3 concludes with a critical 
review and summary of the case study.
in
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Part 4 provides an overall conclusion to the thesis, and a review of its outcomes. It draws 
further inferences regarding the subsidiary aim of the thesis, that is, to contribute to a better 
understanding of the ITSP process in general.
iv
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PA R T I
Research aims, design and techniques
A number of recent surveys have indicated that information technology strategic planning 
(ITSP) is a significant issue in many countries, and its improvement is often the highest 
priority of IT executives (e.g. Baets 1996; Watson and Brancheau 1992: 114-116). In 
general this literature suggests that the ITSP process does not have highly successful 
outcomes, and it is not well understood. A prerequisite for improving outcomes is a better 
understanding of the process itself. The main aim of this research was therefore to 
investigate in detail the ITSP process as it operated within a particular organisation, with 
the aim of interpreting and understanding it within that context, as far as possible. A 
subsidiary aim was to contribute to a better understanding of the ITSP process in general.
Research design has been described as a plan or model which guides the investigator in the 
process of collecting, analysing and interpreting observations. The formulation of an outline 
research design prior to undertaking detailed fieldwork is recommended as a guide for the 
collection of data, and can prevent the investigator straying into unproductive detours (Yin 
1989: 35-40). It also allows the researcher to draw tentative preliminary inferences 
concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation (Yin 1989: 28-35). The 
preliminary research design of this thesis is discussed further below.
The research project utilised the case study technique, which has been defined as “an 
attempt at describing the relationships which exist in reality, usually within a single 
organization” (Galliers 1992: 151). Yin (1989: 13-20) notes that case studies (as opposed 
to other techniques such as surveys) are appropriate when “how” or “why” questions are 
posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on 
explaining a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. These conditions applied 
to the context of this thesis, as noted below. Moreover the researcher had little control over 
any of the events described.
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Galliers (1992: 154-155) notes that the strength of the case study approach is that it enables 
the capture of reality in greater detail than is possible with alternative approaches. Its 
potential weaknesses include the fact that it is normally restricted to a single event or 
organisation, or both. For case studies, the recommended components of the research 
design include:
. the case study’s questions,
. its propositions,
. its unit of analysis,
. the logic linking the data to the propositions, and 
. the criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin 1989:29-35).
In accordance with these recommendations, the components of the preliminary research 
design for the case study were as follows:
Questions
The study basically asked the questions:
. Why was ITSP undertaken by the Organisation at the time of the study?
. How was it attempted?
. How and why was it opposed internally, and ultimately terminated?
. Why did it apparently fail?
Propositions
The initial propositions of the study included:
. that IT strategic planning is driven by organisational needs and values,
. that IT strategic planning is related in some way to the IT governance of the 
Organisation,
. that IT strategic planning is related in some way to the information systems 
of the Organisation, and
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. that all processes within the Organisation, including IT strategic planning, 
are likely to be related to its structure and culture.
Unit o f analysis
The “unit of analysis” of the study (that is, its scope) was initially defined as the process of 
development of an IT strategic plan from inception to acceptance of the final plan, but 
excluding its implementation. It was recognised that the antecedents of the process would 
also need to be investigated where relevant. The study therefore focussed on the period 
1994 to 1996, but also referred to earlier formative influences. The IT strategic planning 
process studied was actually terminated by events within the Organisation - and this in fact 
delineated the scope of the study.
Logic linking the data to the propositions
The initial propositions noted above implied that data would need to be collected and 
observations made in areas which included IT strategic planning, organisational needs, IT 
governance, information systems and organisational structure and culture. However no 
prior assumptions were made about the way in which the data might be related to the 
propositions, beyond the likelihood that they were related in some way. Rather this was the 
subject of ongoing analysis as the data were collected and events unfolded. This is 
consistent with the anthropological research method applied (discussed below), which is 
often data-driven rather than hypothesis-driven. In fact in this approach it would be unlikely 
that the relationship of the data to the propositions would be known in advance, and this is 
more usually the subject of investigation.
Criteria fo r interpreting the findings
No prior assumptions were made about the criteria for interpretation also, but rather these 
were subject to ongoing assessment as the case study progressed. Again this is in keeping
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with the research method used. The criteria for interpretation of an anthropological 
investigation are generally qualitative, although usually based on the prior experience and 
proficiency of the assessor.
The components of the preliminary research design as given above were worthwhile as a 
means of limiting unfruitful detours during fieldwork. However the model stems from the 
traditional scientific method, although it lacks the rigour associated with that approach. The 
scientific method is more relevant for investigations of the natural world, rather than social 
or cultural contexts. A number of writers have noted that research into information systems 
- and related areas such as IT and information management in organisations - has become 
increasingly aware of the limitations of the scientific approach, given the explicitly social, 
or at least socio-technical nature of the field (e g. Fitzgerald et al. 1985 . 5-7; Galliers 1992: 
162; Land 1992: 12). These limitations constrained the extent to which the preliminary 
research design, and in particular its initial propositions, could be applied in practice. Rather 
these were of value as general guidelines during the course of the case study.
The approach of this thesis therefore draws substantially on anthropological methods, which 
have value in investigating social and cultural contexts (discussed further in Part 2). 
Detailed study within the Organisation was carried out using the principal research method 
of cultural anthropology, participant observation (Spradley 1980). A key concept based on 
anthropology - organisational culture - was also used to help elucidate the ITSP process 
(also discussed in Part 2).
The aims, preliminary design and techniques of the research project were outlined in this 
section, noting that the primary aim was to interpret the ITSP process as it operated within 
a particular organisational context, utilising the case study technique. A summary of 
relevant theoretical approaches and literature follows in Part 2, with the aim of identifying 
and examining those areas which are necessary to achieve an understanding of the approach 
to ITSP taken within the Organisation.
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PART 2
Theoretical approaches and literature
Part 2 introduces and discusses selected theoretical approaches and bodies of literature in 
the areas of strategic management and strategic planning (including IT strategic planning), 
broad approaches to strategic planning (including the rational and processual approaches), 
anthropological concepts and methods (including organisational culture, cultural symbolism 
and participant observation) and IT governance. The theoretical approaches in these areas 
are necessary for the interpretation of the ITSP process within the Organisation. They are 
taken up further in Part 3 and applied where relevant to the case study, to facilitate 
understanding.
2.1 Strategic management and strategic planning
Strategic management has been defined as:
“The process of identifying, choosing and implementing activities that will enhance 
the long-term performance of an organisation by setting direction, and by creating 
ongoing compatibility between the internal skills and resources of the organisation, 
and the changing external environment within which it operates (Viljoen 1994: 4).
As Viljoen (1994: 4) notes, this definition implies that the core activity of strategic 
management is the development and implementation of a plan o f action for an organisation 
to ensure its success in the longer term. Strategic planning generally focusses on all aspects 
of strategic management as given in the definition above, with the exception of the 
implementation of the strategic activities. Although strategic planning may have the short 
term objective of producing a strategic plan, it is often held that the planning itself is not a 
discrete, self-contained action but an ongoing process (e.g. Ackoff 1970: 3). That is, if it 
is to be effective, a strategic planning process should be dynamic and iterative. It is often 
recommended that a strategic plan should not be left to “gather dust” - it should be regularly 
reviewed, revised as necessary and any changed arrangements put into practice. These
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concepts are discussed further below, in the context of broad approaches to strategic 
planning.
In this context “strategic” is used as an adjective meaning “relatively consequential”, 
referring both to patterns after actions are taken, as well as to the intentions that may 
precede them (in accordance with Mintzberg 1994: 27). No distinction is made in this thesis 
between “strategies” and “tactics”, in the sense (often used) that strategies refer to more 
important things, tactics to the supporting operational details. This usage has a long 
tradition inherited from the military, where a sharp distinction has historically been made 
between the senior officers who formulate strategies, and the troops who implement the 
plans given to them, in the form of operational tactics. However as Rumelt (1979: 197) 
notes, “one person’s strategy is another’s tactics.... what is strategic depends on where you 
sit.” Moreover, it also depends on when you sit, because what seemed tactical yesterday 
might prove to be strategic tomorrow (Mintzberg 1994: 27). In the context of this thesis 
it is shown in Part 3 that what many employees at the operational “coal face” of the 
Organisation regarded as strategic issues differed from the views of certain key managers.
The general area of strategic management and planning has generated what has been 
described as a “massive literature” (Knights and Morgan 1995). Even in 1969 one writer 
could include a bibliography of 38 pages of earlier references on management planning, in 
a work itself almost 800 pages in length (Steiner 1969). Considerably less has focussed on 
IT strategic planning. However the overall literature is of highly variable consistency. A 
quite large proportion does not entail research, analysis or criticism, but comprises 
prescriptive handbooks, guidelines and the like - and this also applies to the IT planning 
literature. Mintzberg (1994: 4) suggests somewhat cynically that if the total literature were 
an ore body, he could find less than three-quarters of an ounce of “gold” per ton in it (that 
is, about one fifty-thousandth) - referring to studies which have significantly advanced 
understanding.
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This section has provided a brief introduction to the area of strategic management and 
strategic planning. The following section focusses on IT strategic planning.
2.2 Information technology strategic planning
In the context of this thesis, IT  strategic planning is taken to include planning for 
information systems, information architecture, IT resources, IT infrastructure and 
telecommunications. Information systems refer to computer systems designed to provide 
information to users - including application systems, that is, systems developed specifically 
to meet certain sets of users’ needs. Information architecture refers to the overall basic 
structure of an organisation’s computer systems, including the hardware, platforms, systems 
software and related standards. IT  resources refer to the physical, financial and human 
resources needed to support IT. IT  infrastructure refers to the equipment and software 
required to support an organisation’s computer systems, including its networks. 
Telecommunications refers to the exchange of information (e.g. voice, data, images) 
between devices separated by a distance, usually via cable or radio. Clearly there is some 
overlap among the different areas covered by IT strategic planning - this also serves to 
underline the breadth of its coverage.
IT strategic planning often comprises a significant part of the overall strategic planning for 
an organisation - although the two are rarely well integrated. IT strategic planning and a 
major subset of it - information systems (IS) strategic planning - have received increasing 
attention in recent years (e.g. Battaglia 1991; Boar 1993a; Clarke and Cameron 1991; Earl 
1989; Keen 1991; McGee and Prusak 1993; Miller 1988; Pavri and Ang 1995; Premkumar 
and King 1994; Scott Morton 1991). A major issue in the literature is the extent to which 
ITSP is aligned with and supports corporate and business strategies, and enables business 
improvements (e.g. Atkinson and Montgomery 1990; Henderson and Venkatraman 1993). 
In this context “business” refers to the raison d ’etre of the organisation, and not just its
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commercial aspects. For example, the business of an organisation may be focussed on 
science, or social welfare. Many writers have suggested that the frequent inability of 
organisations to derive real value from their IT investments is due in part to a lack of 
alignment or integration between their ITSP and business planning (e.g. Barlow 1990; 
Broadbent et al. 1993). A significant part of the literature is therefore concerned with 
finding or prescribing ways of better aligning ITSP and business strategies (e.g. Broadbent 
and Weill 1993; Laware 1991; Thurlby 1993).
Pavri and Ang (1995) note that much has been written about information systems strategic 
planning (ISSP) - a subset of ITSP - but that little empirical work has been done. Their 
survey of ISSP across 70 Singapore companies included collecting data on the macro­
organisation of each firm. This included whether the firm was operationally divided 
according to function (e.g. finance, personnel), or by product (e.g. food, electronic), or in 
other ways. They found no significant relationship between the practice of ISSP and the 
structure of a firm. They suggest that factors other than organisational structure may drive 
a firm to undertake ISSP, possibly including IS maturity, top management attitudes and 
environmental complexity. They conclude that additional studies are needed, and that “firm- 
specific factors” that inhibit ISSP should be addressed (Pavri and Ang 1995: 36-38, 42). 
However their own data show that if all firms in their survey which are divided by either 
function or product are taken together - that is, all those with some form of internal 
divisional structure - then 19 such firms undertook ISSP as against 29 which did not (Pavri 
and Ang 1995: 36). This suggests that a well developed internal divisional structure may 
not be strongly correlated with the practice of ISSP. This also tends to support the situation 
observed in the case study of this thesis, where a marked divisional structure was associated 
with internal resistance to a particular organisation-wide approach to ITSP (discussed in 
Part 3).
In order to achieve wide applicability of the results, comparative studies across organisations 
require a large sample of organisations. However this approach can suffer from the 
drawback that it may reduce the level of detail addressed in any one organisation, and it can
9
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also “iron out” possibly significant differences among organisations. For example, Pavri and 
Ang (1995: 41) found that 79 per cent of the firms in their sample which undertook ISSP 
had an IS steering committee. That is, the presence of a steering committee apparently 
stimulated ISSP. However a survey does not necessarily reveal the actual effectiveness of 
a steering committee in any given case. For example, it was largely ineffective in the case 
study of this thesis (as discussed in Part 3). Factors such as this can call into question an 
apparent correlation in survey data, and underline the need for careful observation within 
each organisation. This in turn implies that more detailed studies in a limited number of 
organisations are needed.
Some important aspects of strategic planning and IT strategic planning were outlined in the 
sections above, including relevant approaches in the literature. A broad classification of 
general approaches to strategic planning is discussed in the next section.
2.3 Approaches to strategic planning
The identification of broad approaches to strategic planning as adopted in this thesis relies 
heavily on the instrumental work of Mintzberg (e.g. Mintzberg 1978, 1994; Mintzberg et 
al. 1995).
The thesis follows the terminology of Knights and Morgan (1991) in identifying the main 
approaches to strategic planning as “rational” and “processual”. The “rational ” approach 
usually entails a top-down, analytical approach (e.g. Ansoff 1990). Some writers refer to 
the rational approach as “prescriptive” (e.g. Mintzberg 1994). Many proponents of such 
approaches see the rational model as being prescriptive, or present their recommendations 
in a prescriptive manner - but not all do so, and therefore the more moderate term rational 
is used in this thesis.
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The “processuaP approach acknowledges that any realised strategy may be either 
“deliberate” or “emergent”, that is, it may be either deliberately planned via a formal 
process, or it may simply emerge from a complex background of everyday decision-making, 
values and interests, often via a bottom-up method (e.g. Mintzberg 1994). In this model 
organisations are seen as subject to cultural, social and political forces which influence 
strategy. In the processual model, strategy making is holistic and creative, drawing on both 
quantitative and qualitative information. This includes anecdotal information - often fully 
accessible only to those who are in close touch with the “grass roots” of the organisation.
The literature demonstrates that when an organisation adopts a rational approach to 
strategic planing, it often has only limited success (this is discussed further below). In 
contrast it is shown that the processual approach is more likely to be effective, although it 
may be combined to a greater or lesser extent with elements of a rational approach.
The thesis moreover demonstrates that the processual model is valuable as a lens to interpret 
the ITSP process as it actually occurred in the case of the Organisation. That is, the 
outcomes of the ITSP process are better understood as the product of “grass roots” 
perceptions and processes within the Organisation - shaped by the forces of the IT 
governance and the organisational culture - than as the result of “rational” processes.
The two broad approaches to strategic planning are discussed in turn in greater detail in the 
sections below, and they are also applied where relevant to the case study in Part 3.
2.3.1 The rational approach
The “rational”approach proposes that an organisation may choose to follow a logical, 
systematic strategic planning method, and by so doing is able to develop strategies which 
provide the focus and direction needed to manage successfully in an uncertain and changing
3 0009 03162986  3
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environment. This usually entails a management-driven, analytical approach which includes 
such steps as assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the internal environment of the 
organisation, identifying external opportunities and threats, pinpointing the relevant strategic 
forces acting on the organisation, identifying some desirable future state, and developing the 
strategies needed to reach this state. In this model the formulation of strategies is then 
followed by their implementation, as a separate stage. This general approach dominates the 
literature (e.g. Ackoff 1970; Ansoff 1965, 1990; Bowman et al. 1983; Earl 1989; Lorange 
1980; Steiner 1979). It has been uncritically adopted, adapted or propounded in numerous 
prescriptive handbooks and guidelines (e g. guidelines for ITSP such as CCTA 1988 and 
Finance 1991), in many analyses of strategy processes within organisations (e.g. Earl 1993) 
and by many business schools and consultants (e.g. as noted in Knights and Morgan 1995: 
195).
A basic assumption of the rational approach is that it actually is reasonable and logical, and 
that if it should happen to fail in a particular organisation (as it often does), the fault must 
therefore lie with the organisation, not the method. The literature also demonstrates that 
there is a widespread variability and lack of consistency in actual approaches to strategic 
management and planning across organisations. A further deficiency of the rational 
approach is that it fails to account for these variations, but assumes that they arise because 
organisations in some way lack the necessary knowledge and skills to plan competently (e.g. 
as noted in Hann and Weber 1996: 1043).
A number of criticisms have been made of the rational approach per se, and specific aspects 
of it (e.g. Mintzberg 1994; Mintzberg et al. 1995; Mintzberg and Waters 1985). For 
example, a detached, objective assessment of the “strengths” and “weaknesses” of the 
internal environment of an organisation is rarely achievable (Mintzberg 1994: 276-279). It 
is often possible only in relation to a particular context, and then the assessment might vary 
according to the activity. For example, Hofer and Schendel (1978: 150) point out that “one 
cannot tell whether it is a strength or a weakness to be seven feet tall until one specifies 
what the tall individual is supposed to do.” No organisation can ever be completely sure in
12
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advance whether a capability it possesses, or the lack of such capability, will prove over time 
to be a strength or a weakness. Mintzberg (1994: 279) concludes that “strengths and 
weaknesses can be detached neither from each other, nor from specific contexts, or from the 
actions to which they are directed.”
The analytical basis of the rational approach has been criticised, to the effect that the overall 
process is reduced to a complex series of elementary steps, which are then expected to 
operate in their totality to more effectively align the organisation with its environment and 
to promote business success (Mintzberg 1994: 191, 298-303). In the example of Texas 
Instruments, its planning system factored the corporate objective into nine sub-objectives, 
each of which gave rise to several strategies, for each of which there was a strategy 
manager. Each strategy was in turn to be implemented via several tactics, on which 
progress was reported monthly. With the benefit of hindsight, the planning manager later 
said of the discontinued system, “ ...we had the tendency to substitute mechanics for thought 
.... People would fill out forms thinking they were doing strategies. It was strategy by 
cookbook” (quoted in Mintzberg 1994: 301-302). Such planning is intended more to be 
carried out by the automatic application of formal procedures and systems, than by and 
through people in the course of their normal workplace activities. The analytical basis of 
the approach and its focus on simplistic form-filling discourages commitment by those 
expected to make it work.
The rational approach to planning has been compared with that of Taylor (1913) to factory 
production, in which work was analysed into its elementary components, which were then 
reassembled into tasks with the aim of achieving maximum efficiency, but at the cost of 
removing all traces of creativity and discretion. Mintzberg (1994) concludes that, “The 
[real] process of strategy formation simply has different needs - for creativity and synthesis, 
which depends on the discretion of informed actors. The work of creating strategy cannot 
be programmed like that of shoveling coal. Taylor’s engineers could put the steps back 
together into an efficient job; Texas Instruments’ planners never could” (Mintzberg 1994: 
302-303).
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The rational approach is further criticised by Mintzberg (1994: 294-297), who notes that 
within its typical series of elementary steps, “at the heart of the process where strategies are 
supposed to be created, you will find only a set of empty platitudes, not any simulation of 
complex managerial processes.... At best, planners offered checklists: ‘analyze the problem’, 
‘select the preferred course of action’, etc.” However Mintzberg (1994: 319-321) points out 
that rather than being analytical, linear, sequential and orderly, successful managerial work 
is typically simultaneous, holistic and relational: “Managers revel in ambiguity and exhibit 
few patterns in their work, presumably because they spend so much time operating in the 
mode of synthesis.” Similarly, they “may resist steplike structures because the procedure 
they prefer is basically holistic in the sense that all steps are considered simultaneously 
(Weick 1983: 240).
A more effective process of strategy making, according to Mintzberg (1994), would draw 
on all kinds of information inputs, including both “hard” (factual, quantitative data) and 
“soft” (qualitative, verbal and anecdotal information). The “soft” information is often 
accessible only to strategists who are in close touch with the operational details of the 
organisation, rather than detached from them. The process requires insight, creativity and 
synthesis. The literature of the rational school rarely acknowledges or allows for these 
factors, but is permeated with a “normative naivete ... confident beliefs in what is best, 
grounded in an ignorance of what really does work” (Mintzberg 1994: 226-227).
The inherent inflexibility of the rational approach has also been criticised, both as an 
undesirable quality in itself, and because it can inhibit major change occurring in an 
organisation. This inflexibility is the antithesis of creativity, which is capable of overturning 
dysfunctional preexisting categories. For example, Mintzberg comments that “planning 
almost inevitably overlays. .. existing strategies as well as its own procedures on the existing 
structure of the organization. In other words, organizations develop their plans in terms of 
the subunits they already have - be they functions, divisions or departments.... Planning in 
terms of the existing categories discourages the reordering of things, which is generally a 
prerequisite to major change - strategic as well as structural.... Being subjected to planning
14
IT Strategic Planning - A Case Study
means being locked into set categories that generally discourage real creativity” (Mintzberg 
1994: 177, 180). Many writers proclaim a need for “flexible planning” with the ability to 
respond quickly to changes in the environment (as noted in section 2.1). However the main 
thrust of the rational approach is to promote stability , “flexible planning remains just another 
oxymoron, a reflection of vain hopes rather than practical realities.... planning by its very 
nature opts for stability over adaptability. .. The very reason organizations use planning is 
to be inflexible - to set direction” (Mintzberg 1994: 184-185).
The military origins of the term “strategy” have been referred to above, as well as its 
associated sharp distinction between strategy and tactics. This, combined with the 
inflexibility of the rational approach, have underscored some of the greatest failures of the 
rational approach. For example, the planning of the World War I battle of Passchendaele 
was carried out by senior officers in almost total ignorance of actual conditions in the field. 
The weather was not regarded as a strategic issue, merely a tactical detail to be dealt with 
on the ground. As a result, British troops were repeatedly ordered to advance through a sea 
of mud - many, laden with heavy ammunition, slipped into rain-filled shell craters - and 
250,000 died. Mintzberg comments that “anyone who has spent time in the world of 
organizations knows that similar behaviors are all too common” (1994: 187).
As a more recent example, Mintzberg (1994: 117-121) refers to one the most extensive 
failures of rational strategic planning, the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS) 
adopted by the United States government in the 1960s. Many saw the attempt of PPBS to 
plan strategically at a high level as being at odds with the reality “on the ground”- the 
archetypal example being the failure of US policy planning in the Vietnam war. Mintzberg 
concludes that “PPBS.... proved no more adept at realizing its intentions than any other 
planning model. Stating an intention to plan strategically and to couple this with 
programming and budgeting did not achieve anything....” (Mintzberg 1994: 121). It is 
perhaps ironical that PPBS was introduced uncritically to many government departments in 
the 1980s as “program budgeting” (or similar), and is still followed in essence by many. In 
sum, Mintzberg (1994: 97) concludes that, “At the very least, we have found that [rational]
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planning is not ‘the one best way’, that it certainly does not pay in general, and that at best, 
it may have some suitability in particular contexts.”
Within the rational approach, some writers have tried to accommodate various aspects 
which have been seen as obstacles to its success. For example, Earl (1989: 70-76) proposes 
that successful IS strategy formulation could include a combination of top-down and 
bottom-up methods. As another example, it is proposed by some that through “stakeholder 
analysis”, the wants and needs of all the different groups and individuals who could influence 
the outcome could be investigated systematically and factored into the planning process (e.g. 
Freeman 1984). This requires the planning team to identify all stakeholders, their “stake” 
in the organisation, their degree of influence, the criteria they use to judge the organisation 
and how well the organisation has performed on those criteria. However such an approach 
glosses over the substantial problems of undertaking a comprehensive stakeholder analysis, 
and reconciling the often conflicting interests of the stakeholders.
Another suggested accommodation is to include organisational culture within the rational 
approach. For example, Schwartz and Davis (1981) propose that planning should include:
“Step 1: Define the relevant culture and subcultures of the organisation....
Step 2: Organize these statements about the firm’s culture in terms of 
managers, tasks and their key relationships....
Step 3 : Assess the risk that the company’s culture presents to the realization 
of the planned strategic effort....
Step 4: Identify and focus on those specific aspects of the company’s culture 
that are both highly important to strategic successes and 
incompatible with the organizational approaches that are planned 
(Schwartz and Davis 1981: 47).
This proposal demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of the deep-seated and fundamental 
nature of organisational culture. Mintzberg comments that the method would need “a blind 
eye to how it violated the natural functioning of the organisation.... To take culture - so
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deeply rooted in the history and traditions of an organization. .. and work it into the pat 
procedures of the planning cycle seems extraordinarily naive ” (Mintzberg 1994: 145). The 
actual character of organisational culture is discussed further below.
The first of the two broad approaches to strategic planning (rational) was described and 
criticised in this section. It was shown that the rational school entails a logical, analytical 
process, which assumes that an organisation is able to develop strategies which provide 
direction in an uncertain environment. It usually entails a top-down, management-driven 
approach. It was demonstrated that the rational approach often has only limited success.
The other broad approach to strategic planning (processual) is summarised and discussed 
in the next section. It is shown that the processual approach is more likely to be effective, 
although it may be combined with aspects of a rational approach.
2.3.2 The processual approach
This section provides evidence to support the proposal that the processual approach to 
strategic planning is the most effective, and that it is also valuable as a “lens” through which 
the actual processes which occur in an organisation can be better interpreted. Again, it 
relies heavily on the influential work of Mintzberg (e.g. 1994).
Mintzberg (1994: 23-27) notes that the term “strategy” has at least two connotations - 
intended strategy (that is, plans for the future), and realised strategy (that is, consistent 
patterns in past behaviour, often only recognised after the event). Not all intended strategies 
are necessarily realised, but some may be - these comprise deliberate strategy (see Diagram 
1). Those not followed are unrealised strategy. Mintzberg (1994: 25) identifies another 
key type, emergent strategy, which is followed in cases where a pattern is realised in 
practice but was not expressly intended. For example, an organisation may make tentative 
small, low-level decisions of a certain type one by one, each based only on its own merits,
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until a broader pattern emerges, and the organisation realises it has adopted a successful new 
strategy. The strategy was neither deliberately intended nor rationally planned, but it may 
have great significance for the organisation. Mintzberg (1994: 25) gives the example of a 
company which makes diversification decisions one by one, in effect testing the market. 
First it buys an urban hotel, next a restaurant, then a resort hotel, then another urban hotel 
with restaurant, and then another of these, until a pattern or strategy emerges of diversifying 
into urban hotels with restaurants.
Diagram 1 - Types of strategy (from Mintzberg 1994: 24)
IS
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The “processual” approach is therefore a viable alternative to the “rational” school (e.g. 
Mintzberg 1978, 1994; Mintzberg et al. 1995). A key insight of this school is that realised 
strategies are seen as being either “deliberate” or “emergent” (e.g. Mintzberg and Waters 
1985), that is, they may be either deliberately planned via a formal process, or they may 
simply emerge from a complex background of everyday decision-making, values and 
individual and group interests. In this model organisations are seen as complex, and highly 
subject to cultural, social and political forces as well as to rational, top-down management. 
In such an environment an organisation may attempt to undertake rational strategic planning 
- but the outcome is often unsuccessful, and more often it is emergent strategies which are 
actually followed.
In the processual model, strategy making is a holistic, creative and relational process, 
drawing on all kinds of information, including both “hard”, quantitative data and “soft”, 
qualitative information. The “soft” information is often intuitive or anecdotal, and 
accessible only to those who are in close touch with the “grass roots” of the organisation 
(e.g. Mintzberg 1994: 226-227).
If a top-down approach is able to access or “tap into” emergent strategies, for example, by 
using a process of wide participation by employees, it may be, or may appear to be 
successful, and its strategies may be widely followed. That is, if the leaders are able to 
probe deeply into the organisation or else people deep within the organisation are able to 
influence strategy, the process can be effective (Mintzberg 1994: 273-274). Mintzberg 
(1994: 286-287) contends that the dichotomy between the formulation of strategy and its 
implementation - as promoted by the rational school - is actually artificial and inappropriate, 
and that the process is best characterised as continuous strategy formation or organisational 
learning. If the “formulators” of a plan are also simultaneously its “implementors”, effective 
strategy making is possible.
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Mintzberg (1994: 287-289) identifies two main variations of the emergent strategy 
formation process: centralised and decentralised. In the first, the formulator implements, 
that is, a leader monitors the impact of his or her decisions closely and personally, so that 
a strategy can be continually assessed and reformulated during implementation. The 
decentralised situation may apply in a case such as a research laboratory, where strategic 
thinking cannot be concentrated at the centre. In such a case the implementors may also be 
effective formulators of strategy. In some cases an emergent strategy may have its origins 
in some particular initiative undertaken within the organisation. Mintzberg (1994: 287-289) 
describes such a situation as the grass-roots model of emergent strategy formation, where 
strategies may initially grow like weeds in a garden, and are not cultivated like tomatoes in 
a hothouse. Such strategies may proliferate to pervade the organisation, whether this is 
intended or not. If such a process is recognised and properly managed, it may in fact lead 
to the emergence of good strategy. That is, the “weeds” might turn out to be a valuable 
crop, and may take over the garden.
Earl (1989: 76-77) suggests that successful strategies may emerge in part from “bright 
spark” managers who generate innovative ideas which are subsequently adopted. Many 
strategies are in fact at least partially emergent. The process by which some emergent 
strategies may come to be more widely adopted within an organisation (in the absence of 
management decree) can be related to the informal sharing and learning of values within the 
organisational culture, among its members. Mintzberg (1994: 25-26) notes that in practice 
few actual strategies are either purely deliberate or purely emergent. The first suggests that 
an organisation cannot learn from its own experiences, and the latter suggests a lack of 
control. Mintzberg (1983; 1994: 412-413) notes that organisations which in effect have 
strong internal cultures tend to reject attempts at formal strategic planning, but rather rely 
for overall coordination on the standardisation of norms through socialisation within the 
culture. Organisations sometimes take advantage of this situation by pursuing “umbrella” 
strategies, with the broad outlines being deliberate while the details are allowed to emerge 
within them. Such an organisation in effect “learns” (Mintzberg 1994: 209-210), and
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significant changes are possible, in contrast to the rational planning approach. However the 
two types (deliberate and emergent) remain a useful aid to understanding organisational 
processes.
Knights and Morgan (1995) note that both the rational and the processual approaches “tend 
to take for granted the historical self-formation of strategic discourses and practices” (1995: 
196). They propose that it is necessary to undertake detailed study within an organisation, 
in conjunction with study of its history and environment, in order to first understand the 
conditions which make strategic discourse (that is, discussion of strategy) possible within 
the organisation, and then to understand the actual approach taken to strategic planning. 
They found that in the organisation they studied, although from one perspective its IT 
strategic planning process could be regarded as a “failure”, the process actually made good 
sense within its unique organisational and political context (Knights and Morgan 1995: 197­
212). This interpretation has parallels with the case study of this thesis (examined in Part 
3).
It was shown in the section above that the processual approach to strategy making entails 
a creative process, drawing on both quantitative data and qualitative or “soft” information. 
The “soft” information is intuitive or anecdotal, often stemming from the “grass roots” of 
the organisation. A key insight of this school is that realised strategies may be either 
“deliberate” or “emergent” - that is, they may be either deliberately planned, or they may 
emerge from a matrix of everyday decisions, values and interests. In practice few actual 
strategies are either purely deliberate or purely emergent. It was shown that the processual 
approach is also valuable as a “lens” through which to interpret organisational processes in 
general.
The two broad approaches to strategic planning (rational and processual) were described 
and assessed in the sections above. The rational approach usually involves top-down, 
analytical techniques. The processual approach acknowledges that successful strategies are 
just as likely to emerge from the “grass roots” of an organisation. Evidence was presented
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that a processual approach is likely to be more effective than a rational approach, although 
in practice elements of both may be successfully combined.
Further theoretical approaches and areas of literature necessary to interpret the ITSP 
process in the Organisation are discussed in the following sections - namely anthropological 
concepts.
2.4 Anthropological concepts and methods
The anthropological concepts and methods which are necessary for the interpretation of the 
Organisation’s ITSP process are organisational culture, symbolism and participant 
observation. These are discussed in turn below, and they are also applied where relevant 
to the case study in Part 3.
2.4.1 Organisational culture
The concept of organisational or corporate culture has drawn on earlier insights taken from 
the anthropological study of the cultures of human groups (e.g. Foster 1969; Kluckhohn 
1957), in terms of defining culture in general as a set of behaviours, customs, rituals, beliefs 
and values within a broader environmental setting (e.g. Bellingham 1990; Boisot 1987; Deal 
and Kennedy 1988; Passfield 1989; Pheysey 1993; Schein 1985, 1990). Within the 
anthropological approach, the social organisation and structure of a group are generally seen 
as being either closely related to or part of its culture. A significant aspect of culture relates 
to the distribution of status and power within the group, including the power to make key 
decisions, and to have others comply with them.
The notion that an organisation could possess a distinctive culture in a manner similar to that 
of other groups in society has developed over the past fifty years. For example, Jacques 
(1951) cogently described organisational culture as:
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“The customary or traditional ways of thinking and doing things, which are shared 
to a greater or lesser extent by all members of the organisation and which new 
members must learn and at least partially accept in order to be accepted into the 
services of the firm.” (1951: 251)
An important element of this understanding is that cultural values are shared by many 
members of the organisation, and are transmitted to and absorbed by new members in order 
for them to be fully accepted into, and to operate effectively within the organisation. That 
is, organisational culture has a powerful influence on the beliefs and behaviour of its 
members, including their decision-making behaviour.
Duncan (1995: 180-181) notes that organisational culture may include shared mindsets 
(such as values, norms, understandings, assumptions and ascribed meanings), physical 
aspects (such as buildings and other artefacts), rituals (including ceremonies and other 
meaningful patterned behaviour), symbols, organisational stories (such as histories, legends 
and myths), and culture heroes, that is, highly respected figures such as “founding fathers”. 
The elements of a culture are often strongly influenced by its history and the shared 
experiences of its members. Conversely, the culture of a group is often a formative 
influence on the events which contribute to its history.
As understood within cultural anthropology, the values, beliefs and assumptions of a culture 
are deep-seated and usually long-established - they are not superficial or trivial, and only 
rarely recently introduced. To include superficial fashions as a significant part of “culture” 
has little explanatory worth, in the anthropological model. For example, it may be 
appropriate to include “high physical fitness” as a significant value of the organisational 
culture of a military unit, but it may not be appropriate to do so for an organisation which 
has only recently introduced fitness sessions for employees, even if many attend them.
Because the components of a culture are deep-seated, they are highly resistant to change, 
and significant cultural change normally occurs only very slowly - typically over generations.
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In this context a “generation” refers to the typical length of tenure of members of an 
organisation - for instance this might be 10 to 20 years. This also implies that an 
organisation’s culture can normally be changed significantly and rapidly by its leaders only 
with great difficulty (e.g. Viljoen 1994: 480-486), in the absence of major turnover in the 
membership of the organisation.
Organisational culture was introduced in this section. The next section discusses the way 
in which aspects of a culture may be expressed in symbols.
2.4.2 Symbolism
Significant values and beliefs of a culture are often represented by and condensed into 
cultural symbols, which are invested with shared meanings and understandings by the 
members of the society or culture (e.g. Firth 1973). Such a symbol may be tangible, such 
as a flag, document, mountain or monument, or it may be intangible such as a concept, 
motto, anthem or legend. Whatever form it takes, it is capable of representing certain 
principles of a culture or organisation, and reinforcing their importance in the minds of 
members.
Symbols may also be private, that is, individuals or small groups may invest a particular 
symbol or emblem with certain sets of meanings not shared generally within the culture (e.g. 
Firth 1973). In some cases such private symbols may over time become more general, and 
may evolve into broader cultural symbols.
A culture, organisation or group may have one or more dominant or key symbols, which 
represent certain of its core tenets and assumptions. For example, “the Cross” is a dominant 
symbol of Christianity, “Mecca” of Islam and the “Red Cross” is widely recognised as the 
symbol of an international organisation. In other contexts, “the environment” is a key 
symbol for many conservation organisations, “Anzac Day” for the Returned and Services
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League of Australia, and “the home” is highly significant for many Australian families. 
Clearly in cases where cultures or groups overlap, a single person may recognise more than 
one key symbol.
A dominant symbol may have a range of referents or meanings which are polarised into two 
main groups: those which refer to aspects of the prevailing social order, social categories 
and values (the “normative” pole), and those which have physiological associations and 
which appeal to the emotions, desires or appetites of members of the culture (the “orectic” 
pole) (Turner 1967; 1987: 174-175). The two poles of meaning of the one symbol act 
together to reinforce the cultural principles they represent. For example, “the Constitution” 
is a dominant symbol shared by many citizens of the United States of America: the political 
and social order which its contents established (including the “body politic”) is reinforced 
by the strong emotions and desires which it now evokes.
Symbolism as an aspect of culture was outlined in this section. The next section introduces 
a key technique of cultural anthropology, participant observation.
2.4.3 Participant observation
Detailed study within a culture or an organisation is most effectively carried out using the 
principal research method of cultural anthropology, participant observation (Spradley 1980). 
Although this approach was first developed for the ethnographic study of non-Western 
cultures (e.g. Malinowski 1927), it can equally be applied to organisations and industry (e.g. 
Britan and Cohen 1980; Chappie 1941; Gardner and Moore 1964; Gregory 1983; Warner 
and Low 1947).
In this approach the observer is also a participant immersed in the relevant culture or 
organisation, and studies it in detail from the point of view of its own members. The 
researcher must be prepared to investigate and critically analyse the unquestioned, “taken
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for granted”, usually undocumented (and often unarticulated) assumptions, values and 
behaviour of the members of the culture. The researcher is concerned primarily with the 
meaning and significance of events as interpreted within the culture, and not necessarily their 
frequency (Van Maanen 1979).
The approach aims to interpret a culture or organisation by means of ethnographic “thick 
description” of the complex fabric of everyday structures, processes and discourse (Geertz 
1973: 6-10) - as opposed to the “thin description” which may result from a survey spread 
across many target groups. Geertz (1973: 9-10) writes, “What the ethnographer is faced 
with... is a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon 
or knotted into one another, which are at once strange, irregular and inexplicit, and which 
he must contrive somehow first to grasp and then to render.” A participant observer must 
also function as a major instrument in the study (Schwartzman 1986: 241), which implies 
that he or she may also influence the research setting to some extent. Participant 
observation requires detailed understanding of the culture or organisation. Various methods 
can be used to achieve this, typically including close observation of processes and events, 
extensive open-ended discussions, cultivation of knowledgable key informants, examination 
of records and to some extent, surveys. However surveys often have only limited ability to 
reveal deep-seated, largely unarticulated beliefs, unless combined with in-depth discussion 
and observation.
The use of participant observation and anthropological methods in studies of organisational 
behaviour has been recommended by a number of writers (e.g. Sayles 1973; Schwartzman 
1986; Van Maanen 1979). In this vein Campbell (1977: 51) noted that, “There have been 
few observational studies of what organizations actually do.... observations of actual 
behaviour are rare.” To some extent this is still true, although there have since been a 
number of studies of specific organisations or industries (e.g. Charlesworth et al. 1989; 
Knights and Morgan 1995).
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The fundamental anthropological concepts needed for the interpretation of the ITSP process 
in the Organisation - culture and symbolism - were introduced in the sections above. These 
concepts are applied as required in Part 3. The final area in terms of theoretical approaches 
required for this purpose - IT governance - is discussed in the next section.
2.5 Information technology governance
The term governance refers to the framework, or set of rules and guidelines which 
determine the distribution of roles, responsibility, accountability and decision-making power 
in an organisation (e.g. Peters and Savoie 1995). The framework may be explicitly 
formalised and documented, or it may be implicitly understood by members of the 
organisation, or there may be some combination of the two.
Along similar lines Mintzberg (1994: 196, 200) refers to “politics” as the arena of influence 
which is beyond the formally sanctioned system of authority of the organisation. In this 
respect organisational politics form a close parallel to implicit governance. Mintzberg (ibid) 
notes that organisational politics are often cited within the rational school as being 
inconvenient and “irrational” obstacles to successful strategic planning. However when 
informal politics are used to challenge formal authority which is itself attempting to impose 
detrimental strategies, the politics have to be considered not as an obstacle but as a positive, 
constructive process. Moreover politics, whether formal or informal, are in all cases a 
legitimate consideration within the broader anthropological approach (compare Fortes and 
Evans-Pritchard 1970).
The IT  governance of an organisation comprises the implicit or explicit guidelines that 
determine the division of IT roles and responsibilities, how IT decisions are made, how IT 
resources are allocated, and how related processes and information are shared among the 
component units of the organisation. In cases where an organisation is not solely 
responsible for its own IT, the role of IT service providers is also likely to be included in the
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IT governance framework. The role of customers or clients in influencing IT decisions may 
in some cases also be a significant part of the governance.
A number of writers define IT governance as consisting only of explicit guidelines (e.g. 
Raphaelian 1995; Tunick 1996). Such writers generally argue in favour of having formal 
rules of IT governance, to avoid any misunderstanding or conflict within the organisation. 
However a key insight of the definition given by Shipley (1995: 1) is that it includes the 
implicit or informal guidelines which often comprise a significant portion of the IT 
governance framework which operates in practice. Even in cases where formal rules do 
exist, it is often the unwritten, implicit rules which are drawn on in making key decisions. 
For example, in an organisation with highly autonomous component units, it may be widely 
understood (but not explicitly formalised) that each unit will normally make its own 
significant IT (and business) decisions. Shipley (1995: 2) notes that many organisations 
develop formal IT governance guidelines from the top down, but in so doing may not 
acknowledge the significant implicit decision-making power of their units. That is, key 
attributes of the structure and culture of an organisation may have considerable influence 
on the style of IT governance which applies in practice.
Hess (1995: 1-2) expands the concept of IT governance by noting that it includes the 
processes for how IT policy, resources and architectures are established, deployed, 
managed, enforced, amended and retired. As such IT governance has parallels with the 
political process of governments, including such components as a government executive, 
constituents, a legislative body, a legal code, a judicial body, a bill of rights and an 
amendment process (Hess ibid). In some political processes all such components may be 
explicit, in others key components are implicit - for example, some national constitutions 
(such as Australia’s) have many implicit connotations, which may require clarification 
through judicial processes. The comparability of IT governance and political processes 
means that in broad terms, particular styles of IT governance may be compared with political 
regimes, and may be described for example as democratic, autocratic, federated, socialist, 
and so on.
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As such the IT governance framework is often shaped by, and is part of the broader 
framework of organisational culture (see also Diagram 2 below). A significant aspect of 
organisational culture relates to the distribution of power within the group, including 
decision-making power (as noted above). The way in which IT decisions are made within 
an organisation typically parallels the broader distribution of decision-making power.
Often the most visible outcome of an organisation’s IT governance framework is its set of 
information systems and their nature. For example, a federated IT governance may result 
in systems which are fragmented across organisational units, with little overall coordination. 
In cases where the information systems have evolved over a number of years, they in turn 
may exert a significant influence on the style of IT governance. For example, the need to 
maintain separate large legacy systems within a number of different organisational units may 
discourage the emergence of an integrated, corporate style of IT governance.
Raphaelian (1995: 1-2) notes that the predominant IT governance style of the 1960s and 
1970s was authoritarian or technocratic, based on the technological decision-making power 
of the central IT group. This style of governance had parallels with theocratic regimes 
(similar to that of Tibet under the Dalai Lama) - absolute power was centred in a technical 
“priesthood”, which possessed arcane IT knowledge not held by others in the organisation, 
and which used this to make unilateral decisions believed to be in the best interests of the 
organisation.
However the “PC revolution” of the 1980s largely undermined the authoritarian IT 
governance style in many organisations, leaving decision-making power fragmented between 
the central IT group and the distributed users. Looking from the top of the organisation, 
this situation often appeared anarchic. Raphaelian (1995: 1-2) notes that many organisations 
subsequently failed to formalise their IT governance framework, leaving organisational units 
to make whatever decisions they believed necessary to “get the job done”. In many cases 
this resulted in inconsistent IT standards and approaches across the organisation, and 
“pollution” of the information architecture.
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Although these observations are no doubt true for many organisations, they do not explain 
why many organisations failed to formalise their IT governance framework after the “PC 
revolution” abated in about 1990. It is argued in this thesis that in the case of the 
Organisation, this was largely due to the influence of an internal culture which fostered the 
autonomy of organisational units, and which resisted the development of a strong central 
IT governance (discussed further in Part 3). While the PC revolution did have some effect 
in the Organisation and its predecessors, it could not fully account for the observed 
situation, since most corporate systems were mainframe-based and maintained centrally.
Organisations using IT usually follow some particular overall IT strategy at any given time, 
whether formalised or not. A key outcome of an IT strategy is often a set of information 
systems (IS) - and ISSP is usually a major subset of ITSP. Normally the IT strategy is set 
within the IT governance framework, whether this is explicit or implicit. Implicit IT 
strategies often emerge within the context of an implicit IT governance framework, and both 
may be influenced or shaped by the organisational culture. Typically an ITSP process 
includes the identification of strategies for the allocation of IT resources among 
organisational units - which is also a key element of IT governance (Shipley 1995). If IT 
strategic planning is undertaken, to be successful it must normally be in accordance with the 
prevailing principles of IT governance. As such it is important to investigate the style of IT 
governance as a significant factor in understanding the particular approach to ITSP adopted 
within an organisation, and its success or failure. As shown above, in order to fully 
apprehend the IT governance framework, it is often necessary to understand the 
organisational culture.
Diagram 2 (below) represents a model which summarises some of the key relationships 
which have been drawn out in Part 2. It shows that organisational history, structure and 
culture can mutually influence one another to form a triad, which is capable of strongly 
influencing or shaping another triad consisting of IT governance, information systems and 
IT strategy, which in turn can mutually influence one another. This second triad often also 
acts to reinforce the principles of the organisational culture and structure. It is shown in
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Part 3 that these relationships applied within the context of the Organisation.
Diagram 2 is to some extent an idealised model. The relationships shown could in some 
cases be disrupted by factors external to the model. For example, the leadership of an 
organisation might impose arbitrary changes to its structure, IT governance, information 
systems or IT strategy. However as shown in Part 3, such changes may be difficult to 
impose if they conflict with basic values such as those of the organisational culture.
Part 2 discussed the main theoretical approaches and areas of literature which are required 
to elucidate the ITSP process in the Organisation. These entail general approaches to 
strategic planning (rational and processual), anthropological concepts (organisational 
culture, symbolism and participant observation) and IT governance. The potential 
relationships among a number of these factors are summarised in Diagram 2. The 
theoretical approaches and concepts are applied where relevant to the case study in Part 3, 
and the actual relationships among them are also investigated in this context.
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Diagram 2 - Organisational culture and its influences
--------->  influences
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PART 3 
Case study
Part 3 describes and examines the case study, focussing on all aspects necessary to interpret 
the ITSP process in the Organisation. The theoretical approaches introduced in Part 2 are 
applied to facilitate understanding. Part 3 discusses in turn the overall research setting, the 
main research technique (participant observation), organisational culture, cultural 
symbolism, strategic management planning, internal communication and IT. The treatment 
of IT examines in turn IT service provision, IT governance, information systems, the IT 
section, the IT manager and a key earlier IT project. The ITSP process within the 
Organisation is then analysed further in regard to client/server computing, client/server 
computing as an Organisation strategy, the further development of the IT strategic plan, and 
the outcomes of the ITSP process. Part 3 concludes with a critical review of the case study.
At the time of writing, the situation within the Organisation had already started to undergo 
considerable change, and more was expected to follow. The case study is therefore 
described in the past tense, even though various aspects of it were still current at the time 
of writing.
3.1 Research setting - the Organisation
The Organisation was a partly commercialised business unit of a government department 
(the “parent department”). Although at least one branch of the Organisation could be traced 
back to the 1920s, the Organisation in the form studied was largely created in the 1960s, 
with the formation of a scientific body set up to evaluate certain types of products which 
private companies submitted for approval to sell. This body still existed in the form of a 
major branch of the Organisation at the time of the study (the “Laboratories” branch). The 
other four scientific branches of the Organisation had similar histories - two became part of 
the Organisation in 1989-90, and two joined in 1994-96 (see Diagram 3). All five scientific
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branches retained a strong sense of autonomy and individual scientific expertise. As a result 
there had never been any strong sense of corporate unity among the branches, and there was 
a generally low level of integration across the Organisation. A sixth branch (“General 
Services”) was established in 1989-90 to provide common services to the Organisation as 
a whole.
In the terms of the model represented by Diagram 2 (see above), the history of the 
Organisation influenced its structure to a considerable extent. The history also significantly 
influenced the organisational culture (as shown later).
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Diagram 3 - The Organisation and its structure
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The main functions of the Organisation were:
. evaluation and approval of products before their sale;
. testing products already on the market for their safety, effectiveness and adherence 
to standards;
. investigating reported problems in products on the market; and
. inspecting factories producing goods to ensure that their manufacturing practices 
were acceptable.
Complementary activities included the monitoring of advertisements for products to ensure 
they were accurate, overseeing arrangements for the withdrawal of defective products from 
the market, and providing advice to industry and consumers on regulatory requirements.
The Organisation essentially had a government “monopoly” in all of its functions, and was 
not subject to any competition in the generally accepted sense. To some extent this led to 
a perception of the Organisation as being authoritarian by the industry it regulated. 
Nevertheless the Organisation had a legally binding obligation to carry out its role. The 
Organisation was also subject to government, political and industry pressures to continually 
improve its efficiency and effectiveness in its use of public funds, and in the quality of the 
services it provided to clients.
The main client groups of the Organisation were government, industry and consumers. The 
industry sector which it regulated paid for a substantial part of the costs of the Organisation, 
by paying fees for product evaluations and approvals. Consequently there was overt 
pressure from industry to evaluate products in the shortest possible time. At the same time 
there were pressures from consumers and consumer groups to ensure the safety and 
effectiveness of products. The products had the potential to either significantly enhance or 
(in some cases) endanger the well-being of consumers.
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The pressure from government on the Organisation was twofold - to evaluate products in 
the shortest possible time and at the least cost, while at the same time ensuring as far as 
possible their safety and effectiveness. These ideals were to some extent conflicting. The 
conflicting pressures on the Organisation had long been a significant source of tension within 
the Organisation and industry.
Mintzberg (1994: 194-195) notes that the rational, analytical approach to planning (see 
section 2.3.1) favours goals which can be readily quantified. Other goals such as product 
quality and social goals may be harder to quantify, and are therefore less emphasised. The 
approach of the government conformed to the rational planning model, to the extent that 
it exerted pressure on the Organisation to continually reduce the time and cost of product 
evaluations, and monitored and publicised the outcomes.
The Organisation was headed by a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and each of the six 
branches was headed by a director. The General Services Branch had responsibility for 
common services to the whole of the Organisation, including the provision of certain internal 
IT services by the IT section of the branch. The remaining branches were all more closely 
aligned with the scientific functions of the Organisation. Each branch was in turn divided 
into a number of sections (typically about six), each with a section manager. The sections 
for the most part had discrete, clearly defined functions - many of which were associated 
with a particular scientific discipline, which often also gave its name to the unit. The 
evaluation and approval of a product by the Organisation typically involved multiple 
processes carried out within various branches and sections - some sequentially, some 
simultaneously. The Organisation had a total of about 500 employees (within the larger 
parent department), of which about 350 were scientific officers or related technicians. 
These employees were approximately equally divided among the scientific sections. A 
significant proportion of the annual budget expenditure of the Organisation was recovered 
in fees paid by private industry.
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Of the 500 employees about 210 were women, or about 42 per cent of the total. Of the 
scientific and technical staff, about the same proportion were women. For much of the 
period of the study the Organisation’s executive (the CEO plus the directors) consisted 
entirely of men. However towards the end there were three women as directors (about 
half). During the study, of the 44 managers of sections and units in the Organisation, eight 
were women (about 16 per cent). Of the ten information system managers, two were 
women. It was not possible to obtain official data on the ages of employees or their length 
of service in the Organisation.
The research setting for the case study was described in this section. The way in which the 
main research technique of the case study - participant observation - was applied is 
discussed in the next section.
3.2 Participant observation
The value of participant observation as the main research technique of cultural anthropology 
(e.g. Spradley 1980) was outlined in section 2.4.3. The case study of the Organisation 
initially focussed on understanding the approach taken to IT strategic planning, and the 
background to this. However in order to fully understand this, the study soon required 
expansion to include the IT governance and information systems, which in turn led on to 
include the organisational history, structure and culture. The participant observation 
methods used to achieve this included the observation of processes and events, attendance 
at meetings wherever possible (both IT-related and other), extensive informal discussions 
with employees, cultivation of knowledgable key informants who had worked for the 
Organisation or its predecessors for several years (some up to 20 years or more), and 
examination of records of meetings, reports of reviews and audits, information system 
specifications, system user guides, electronic and paper files, memoranda, electronic mail 
messages and other documents (see “Internal documents”).
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During the study the researcher had extensive informal discussions with the IT manager, the 
system managers and other employees at middle management level and below. The field 
research had only limited access to senior managers. The study was therefore primarily 
undertaken from the perspective of the system managers and “grass roots” employees in 
general.
The next two sections apply two key anthropological concepts needed for the interpretation 
of the case study - organisational culture and cultural symbolism.
3.3 Organisational culture
The concept of organisational culture (e.g. Duncan 1995) and its place in anthropology were 
discussed in section 2.4.1. The internal culture which prevailed in the Organisation is best 
described as “scientific autocracy” (this is justified below). A variety of applied scientific 
disciplines were represented in the Organisation, including both biological and physical 
sciences. The work of employees was primarily in applied science and technology, and little 
“pure” science or research was undertaken, although many employees had post-graduate 
qualifications. However the Organisation regularly published technical reports and 
occasional papers.
The practitioners of each scientific discipline tended to cluster in discrete, specialised 
organisational units with professionals of their own kind. This situation had come about 
over the years largely because scientific managers had typically expanded and consolidated 
their sections by employing staff members generally within their own disciplines, in order 
to better support their own responsibilities and interests. New scientific employees had in 
their turn generally sought specialist positions within their own discipline, with a manager 
of their own kind - and they freely acknowledged that their careers and professional 
recognition were best served in this way. Some employees referred to the various groupings 
as “tribes”, with an emphasis on their separateness. There was an acknowledged focus on
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individual and small group achievement, as opposed to corporate teamwork. The wider 
multi-skilling of employees and job rotation were concepts not widely supported within the 
Organisation.
Within the scientific culture, analytical ability, problem-solving ability and resourcefulness 
were valued. Formal tertiary qualifications were well regarded and often mandatory, and 
were frequently included with employees’ names on correspondence and business cards 
(unlike many other public sector organisations). A study within one branch suggested that 
scientific employees spent on average 25 per cent of their time on professional training and 
development, whereas other employees averaged 5 per cent. One employee commented, 
“They look at the letters after your name first, here.” The qualifications of other employees 
were a popular topic of discussion. In their opening remarks in articles and speeches, the 
Organisation’s senior managers and political leaders would often draw attention to their 
scientific credentials. Membership of professional scientific bodies was valued. The 
Organisation’s library resources also showed a strong leaning towards the scientific 
disciplines represented in the workplace, at the expense of other areas such as management 
or IT. The current issues of about 300 scientific journal titles were purchased, but only a 
few popular computing magazines were held.
The scientific functions of the Organisation were perceived as predominant. As one 
indication, the floor space available per scientific employee was significantly greater than 
that for each non-scientific employee. While not directly comparable, in practice this meant 
that many of the scientific work areas appeared quite spacious, whereas many other areas 
appeared confined. As another example, in one branch a calendar was publicised showing 
the anticipated leave of employees - but scientific managers were excluded, with the 
implication that their availability was not for scrutiny.
Charlesworth et al. (1989) offer an anthropological study of an Australian medical research 
community, with the aim of understanding how a small group of scientists did their work. 
These investigators found that not only did the scientific work take place within a specific
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social context, but that the context formed and shaped it. The scientific knowledge was not 
gained by an objective reading of nature, but was “constructed”, with the social context of 
the organisation playing a large part in its construction. The social context formed a distinct 
sub-culture or “life-world”, with its own unique set of shared beliefs, attitudes, assumptions 
and practices. In this respect the Organisation was similar, in the sense that its context 
formed a distinct “life-world” based on its applied scientific role.
The scientific culture of the Organisation had been fairly stable for many years. It was 
capable up to a point of changing and modernising in regard to its technology - but with 
some important provisos. Because the basic values of the scientific culture were deep- 
seated and long-established, they were highly resistant to change. This was graphically 
illustrated by the fact that a fair proportion of the laboratory equipment and technology was 
largely outdated even by 1989, when the Organisation was established in the form studied. 
This came about because the technology had tended to move away from “wet” laboratory 
work (that is, using test tubes, sinks, complex plumbing, etc.) towards increased use of 
electronic analytical equipment. This trend had been apparent even in the early 1980s, when 
the laboratories were designed. However, by 1996 the “wet” laboratories still existed and 
occupied a reasonable portion of the Organisation’s building - despite the fact that some 
were little used, and were described by some employees as “ghost towns”. This situation 
continued in spite of the pressing need of some other sections for more floor space.
Within the scientific units their managers tended to operate in an autocratic manner - rarely 
consulting others fully, and rarely communicating in any substantial way with other units. 
However many did communicate quite extensively with their external professional peers. 
This style of management was generally accepted by employees, because in most cases 
decisions were believed to be correct, as they were understood to be backed up by scientific 
expertise, qualifications and experience. Moreover, because there were many different 
disciplines represented, full communication on scientific matters was often not possible 
across organisational boundaries. Within the organisational culture it was legitimate to 
discuss and decide issues within small, expert groups. Larger committees of scientific
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“experts” were also used to assist in major decisions, with members drawn from a variety 
of other organisations including acadaemia and industry. However in most cases these 
committees were established by legislation or government requirements.
A typical comment by employees concerning another organisational unit was, “They don’t 
know or care about anything else except their own work.” One employee remarked that, 
“When I carry out a [laboratory] test on a sample, I never know where it comes from or 
where it goes - I’m never given the full picture.” In reference to the paucity of 
communication both across units and between management and staff, some employees in 
one section commented that they had been “orphaned”: “No-one takes any real notice of us 
or what we do. They might know in general what we are supposed to do, but we hardly see 
them from one year to the next.”
The generally low level of internal communication was frequently also extended to non­
scientific matters, and had over time become a feature of the organisational culture. As a 
result the culture did not highly value internal communication, consultation, participative 
decision-making, multi-disciplinary teamwork or collaboration. In a few cases the autocratic 
manner of some managers was only grudgingly accepted, because it was associated with a 
manner perceived as being arrogant - however this was not widespread. More often, the 
independent, self-contained presentation of many managers was esteemed and emulated by 
employees, and seen as being an integral part of a professional scientific approach.
The man who was the CEO for more than five years until 1996 was a former scientist, held 
in high regard by most employees. For all this time he had presided with apparent 
satisfaction over the high degree of functional separation within the Organisation, with the 
tacit approval of most employees. The management style of this CEO was authoritarian and 
brusque in the style of the scientific organisational culture, and this also was accepted by 
employees because it was understood to be backed up by expertise and achieved status. The 
CEO also accepted blunt advice from employees whom he believed to have the necessary 
expertise to base it on. In describing the way the CEO made decisions on submissions from
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subordinates, one employee said, “No one used to give him options - they’d just give him 
their recommendation. If he liked it, he’d approve it, if not, he wouldn’t - and that was the 
end of it. It didn’t matter what anyone else thought. But most often it worked out alright, 
and most people were happy with what he decided.”
The senior executive of the Organisation (that is, the CEO plus the branch directors) was 
dominated by managers with scientific backgrounds. Only one did not have a scientific 
background - the General Services director. In 1996 a new director appointed to head one 
scientific branch had a stronger scientific background than her predecessor, with extensive 
research and scientific management experience. Although having broader management 
responsibilities, the senior managers operated substantially in the manner of the scientific 
managers at lower levels, consistent with the organisational culture. This was expressed in 
various ways, including the fact that senior managers rarely communicated directly with 
their full complement of employees, and often only sparingly with those who reported 
directly to them.
Both the functional disciplinary specialisation and the low level of internal communication 
were also consistent with the educational experience of many of the scientific staff. Many 
universities, at least in the period prior to about 1980, had a distinct separation among the 
various scientific disciplines. There are still marked divisions among some disciplines, 
particularly between the physical and biological sciences (compare Mayr 1997). Prior to 
1980 also, many tertiary science and technology courses then required negligible oral 
presentation ability, and often only limited written communication skills (personal 
observation). As one example of the outcomes of this, an employee commented that certain 
managers would “go to any lengths” to avoid the need to give formal presentations within 
the Organisation.
An organisation with a scientific culture need not necessarily have poor internal 
communication. For example, Labovitz and Tanner (1987: 39-41) describe a biotechnology 
company 15 years old which had retained an entrepreneurial character and which featured
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a free flow of information at all levels. The relative youthfulness of the company may have 
been a factor, along with the “cutting edge” nature of its technology. However there is 
likely to be no direct relationship between the characteristics of a scientific organisation and 
the quality of its internal communication - it is likely that each organisation would require 
investigation on its own terms.
To a large extent the sense of autonomy of the individual branches and many of the sections 
of the Organisation stemmed from its history. A number of sections reflected their diverse 
origins as separate scientific organisations in different locations. As a result, there was a 
general lack of a sense of corporate unity and cohesiveness. This was expressed in several 
ways, for example, many employees considered that each branch should be separately 
responsible for its own branch-based strategic planning, including IT strategic planning. 
Branches often also used their own individual letterheads and logos for correspondence, 
despite the fact that corporate standards did exist. Many branches had their own individual 
terminology, and in some cases they had different understandings of the same term. 
Certainly a sense of shared, collective responsibility for the work and outcomes of the 
Organisation was not a value of the organisational culture (compare Majchrzak and Wang 
1996: 95).
With respect to the model of Diagram 2 (in Part 2), the history of the Organisation had a 
significant formative influence on both its structure and culture. Equally, the organisational 
culture, once entrenched, had acted to maintain and reinforce the overall structure.
Hammer (1990) addresses the question of why many organisations have apparently 
dysfunctional fragmentation in their functions and processes, with work organised as a 
sequence of separate tasks, with elaborate control mechanisms aimed at making them 
cooperate. He suggests that such arrangements stem from the Industrial Revolution, when 
the specialised division of labour was introduced to overcome the inefficiency of cottage 
industries (Hammer 1990: 107; see also Jones 1995: 1-3). Although this may be broadly 
true of the present situation in industrialised countries, it does not necessarily explain the
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structure of specific organisations. Hammer (1990: 110) goes on to suggest that, “Many 
of our procedures were not designed at all; they just happened. The company founder one 
day recognised that he didn’t have time to handle a chore, so he delegated it to Smith. 
Smith improvised...” Again, while this may have happened in some cases, it is not a general 
explanation, and it also fails to explain just why the founder delegated authority, and allowed 
Smith to improvise at will. In the context of the Organisation, the concept of organisational 
culture and its influences (see Diagram 2) have greater potential for interpreting the 
observed situation.
The values of the dominant scientific culture of the Organisation had been largely absorbed 
over the years by many non-scientific employees who had been exposed to it, even if they 
had not held such values previously. Such a process of acculturation (or assimilation) is a 
well-known phenomenon, and has been studied extensively by anthropologists. For 
example, Evans-Pritchard (1941; 1970: 280) observed that many members of the Nuer 
group of the Sudan had originally been members of a neighbouring group, but after 
becoming located in Nuer territory were “converted” to the Nuer culture.
The low level of internal communication also resulted in an organisational culture in which 
secrecy and selective use of information featured significantly. Information and knowledge 
were not freely shared, and there was an explicit acknowledgment of the relationship 
between knowledge and power. In many cases it was openly acknowledged by employees 
that even apparently inconsequential information would probably not be forthcoming from 
some managers, because to do so could erode their power bases.
This section applied the anthropological concept of organisational culture - as introduced 
and discussed in Part 2 - to the context of the case study, to assist understanding. The next 
section applies the other key anthropological concept needed for the interpretation of the 
case study - cultural symbolism.
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3.4 Organisational cultural symbolism
The way in which certain values of a culture may be condensed into cultural symbols (e.g. 
Firth 1973) was discussed in section 2.4.2. The scientifically-based culture of the 
Organisation could be seen as being represented by one particular key symbol which 
condensed many of its central principles: “the Laboratory”. The main Organisation building 
was designed in the early 1980s as a dedicated laboratory building for the predecessor 
organisation which became the Laboratories branch of the Organisation. It was completed 
later at a high cost, and contained extensive laboratory facilities and equipment. The 
ongoing running costs of the scientific branches were high, for both scientific staff salaries 
and laboratory equipment and supplies.
Laboratory space dominated the internal layout of the building, occupying over 60 per cent 
of the working areas. The Organisation was in fact originally called the “...Laboratories”, 
in recognition of its origin in the 1960s as a laboratory-centred body, the similar origin of 
some other branches prior to 1989, and the continued significant role of laboratories in the 
functioning of the Organisation. Many employees and others still called the Organisation 
the “....Laboratories”, and this name appeared (incorrectly) on a sign outside the building. 
The building had a distinctive appearance, and its image was often used prominently in 
publicity material such as brochures, newsletters and calendars. The fact that the “wet” 
laboratories still existed after several years and occupied a good portion of the 
Organisation’s building, although their usage had diminished (see above), also underlined 
the potency of “the Laboratory” as a dominant symbol.
For scientific employees, the symbol of “the Laboratory” often occurred in discourse in a 
variety of contexts, including conversations, chance remarks, documents, messages and 
newsletters. From these sources, it was apparent that the symbol had connotations for many 
employees which included the following:
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(al) the tangible, physical building with its high quality, expensive scientific facilities, 
equipment and resources;
(a2) productivity and efficiency, exemplified by the perceived professional scientific 
approach of the Organisation;
(a3) the perceived high value of the Organisation’s applied scientific work to the 
community, exemplified by the high ongoing costs needed to ensure the safety of the 
products for the public;
(a4) a sense of the distinctiveness of the Organisation as an instrument of government - 
of being separate and different from most other public sector organisations;
(bl) a general sense of pride in successful applied scientific work and technological 
achievement;
(b2) the broader scientific method and experimental approach, with their associated 
precision, rigour, objectivity and search for explanation and understanding;
(b3) the possession and generation of arcane scientific knowledge - which was not widely 
understood or its significance fully appreciated by laypersons; and
(b4) the potential for scientific creativity, talent and insight to advance and benefit 
humankind in general.
A dominant symbol may have a range of referents which fall into two main classes: those 
which refer to aspects of the social order, social categories and values (the “normative”), 
and those which have physiological associations and which appeal to the emotions and 
desires of members of the culture (the “orectic”) (Turner 1967; 1987: 174-175). In the case 
of the Organisation, the dominant symbol of “the Laboratory” had connotations (al) to (a4) 
(see above) which related in broad terms to the instrumental function of the Organisation 
and its important role within the wider society, and connotations (bl) to (b4) which 
generally elicited positive and favourable emotions related to the nature of the work. Taken 
together, the two classes of referents of the symbol “the Laboratory” acted together to 
reinforce the organisational cultural principles they represented.
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In terms of physiological associations, the laboratory work was sometimes referred to as the 
“heart” of the Organisation. This was occasionally accompanied by some disparagement of 
the document-based evaluation of other areas, or “paperwork” - although it was 
acknowledged that this was also essential. Also, the complex network of expensive, special 
purpose plumbing and cabling which delivered various fluids and services was sometimes 
referred to as being the “life blood” of the laboratories. However probably more significant 
in terms of physiological referents, there was a distinct recognition that the accurate 
assessment of products by the Organisation could in some cases have “life or death” 
consequences. For example, a political leader commented in a speech on the importance of 
the proper scrutiny of products which have the potential to “save lives when used well and 
to take lives when not” (1997).
In regard to the emotions elicited by the symbol, an internal Organisation staff newsletter 
offered reinforcement of the favourable view of science taken by many employees: the 
prominent scientific author Richard Dawkins was quoted approvingly as saying in a press 
interview:
“[Science] is like music or great art. It is an experience in its own right, in 
competition with religion and seeking to answer the same questions. What I do best 
is promote an understanding of the poetry of science....” (Organisation newsletter 
1996)
In a similar vein, a political leader of the Organisation said in a (written) speech:
“.... I believe there is no essential difference between artistic creativity and scientific 
creativity.... Many people look at Michelangelo’s David, Mozart s music or 
Shakespeare’s plays for inspiration. I look to Rutherford, Loewi, Einstein, Crick 
and Watson for my inspiration.... to me, the great essence of science, that takes it 
beyond art or literature, is its capacity to improve humanity.... No doubt in the 
future, scientific talent, creativity and insight will continue to better 
humankind.”( 1996)
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However there appeared to be little overt recognition within the Organisation that the need 
for scientific insight on some issues affecting humankind (such as nuclear waste and 
environmental pollution) actually stemmed from earlier misuses of science or technology.
This section identified and discussed a key symbol of the Organisation - “the Laboratory”. 
By applying the theoretical approach outlined in Part 2, it was shown that this symbol 
condensed and reinforced significant values of the scientific culture. More generally, the 
structure and internal culture of the Organisation were described and analysed in the sections 
above, to set the scene for the following discussion of the approach taken to strategic 
planning.
3.5 Organisation strategic management planning
The relevant theoretical approaches and literature relating to strategic management and 
strategic planning were discussed in Part 2 (sections 2.1 and 2.3). This section introduces 
the “official” approach to strategic planning taken by the Organisation, applying the theory 
as appropriate - primarily in terms of the rational model of strategic planning (e.g. Ansoff 
1990; see section 2.3.1).
The Organisation produced its first corporate “strategic management plan” in 1994 (and no 
further such plan had been produced at the time of study). The key factors which led to this 
plan included a government review in 1991 which recommended that the Organisation 
develop such a plan, and government pressure for greater efficiency and effectiveness. A 
rising level of general awareness in business and government of strategic planning and its 
perceived worth also contributed, as illustrated by an increasing number of management 
consultancies which offered strategic planning services.
The strategic management plan was produced by external consultants in accordance with 
the rational model. The plan stated that the CEO was “responsible for strategy development
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but is dependent on a consultative process to ensure communication across [the 
Organisation], There is a need to use the skill, experience and expertise of all persons who
can contribute to the formulation of new policies and procedures.... ” Within the public
sector over previous years there had been a considerable amount of rhetoric about the value 
of consultation and employee participation (generally under the banner of “industrial 
democracy”), and these were key elements in the strategic plan. The plan proclaimed that:
“The branch directors' meetings.... will include strategic planning through including 
agenda items and position papers coming from the CEO. .. Consultative processes 
will be developed to ensure that all staff participate in the discussions related to 
future planning and policy decisions. This will take place from a bottom-up 
approach.... The discussions and decisions taken at branch directors' meetings will 
be openly available to all members of staff and will be discussed downwards to 
branches and sections following branch directors' meetings” (Organisation strategic 
management plan 1994).
There was also a joint Organisation-union consultative forum, in which senior management 
and union and professional association delegates met quarterly to discuss major issues. The 
strategic management plan noted that this would “not displace the major consultative 
process which will have the bottom-up approach and complementary consultation process”.
Following on from the corporate “strategic management plan”, in 1995-96 the Organisation 
undertook to prepare more detailed operational business plans for each branch, on an 
individual basis. The approach taken to developing these fell squarely within the rational 
school. In at least one branch, “key result areas” were set by its director, together with 
goals, performance targets and strategies designed to meet them. Armed with proformas 
containing these predefined details, each section was then asked to identify - but only for 
each strategy relevant to it - sets of activities, outcomes, resources and timeframes which 
would address that strategy. Little opportunity was provided for employees to comment on 
or alter the predefined framework. The information provided by the sections then flowed 
upwards to the director, where it was collated into the branch plan. At this point the 
information was severely abridged and reduced to only a few key activities per strategy -
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thereby losing much of the finer detail which had been provided by the sections. The 
intention had been to collate the branch plans into an Organisation-wide business plan. 
However in practice less than half the branches actually developed business plans, and no 
corporate business plan was produced.
At that stage no attempt was made to integrate ITSP into the strategic planning process. 
The publicly declared strategic management principles of the Organisation, as expressed in 
its strategic management plan were outlined in this section, and identified as falling within 
the rational model of strategic planning. The next section addresses the extent to which 
some of these proclaimed principles were reflected in practice in the Organisation.
3.6 Internal communication
Despite the generally positive tone and consultative rhetoric of the “rational” 1994 strategic 
management plan, the reality was quite different, and this is discussed below. The strategic 
plan had identified as significant weaknesses a lack of co-ordination and poor 
communication among the branches:
“[The Organisation] must work as a whole.... Cultural and organisational change... 
must also allow for co-operation and communication between the branches and 
sections.... Opportunities for co-operation and teamwork must be identified 
wherever possible” (Organisation strategic management plan 1994).
The plan had never been well accepted within the Organisation, and its existence was not 
even widely known about. In part this was due to the fact that it had been prepared in a top- 
down fashion by external consultants, and there was little sense of ownership by employees. 
There was also little management commitment to the plan, and in particular to its integrative 
aspects - despite the fact that senior management had initiated the planning process. 
However to a large extent it was also due to the fact that the plan promoted values which 
were not generally recognised as being applicable within the culture of the Organisation - 
namely consultation and cooperation - and which were therefore passively resisted.
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In practice, the CEO did meet formally with the directors of the various branches at 
approximately fortnightly meetings, at which management decisions were made. Shortly 
after the meeting each branch director usually met with the section managers of his or her 
branch, primarily to verbally pass on relevant information. Soon after this each section 
manager was expected to meet with his or her staff for the same purpose - however this 
tended to occur much less frequently.
At the various meetings below branch director level there was some limited scope for 
employees to comment on decisions made at higher levels, but there was no formal process 
of capturing these suggestions and feeding them up the hierarchy. There were normally no 
staff meetings held just prior to either branch directors’ or section managers’ meetings, and 
staff were rarely asked for their timely input on any significant issues. Many employees had 
never seen any branch directors’ meeting minutes. On the infrequent occasions when the 
views of employees were sought (such as during the IT strategic planning process - 
discussed below), they responded only very sparingly, partly because they were 
unaccustomed to being consulted in a meaningful way.
The minutes of branch directors’ meetings were available to selected employees in the form 
of electronic copies on a computer network server. However these were not publicised, and 
access was controlled and difficult to obtain. In any event, the minutes were highly abridged 
and “sanitised” versions of events, and actually documented little more than some major
decisions, after the event.
Shared space on servers on computer networks was available for the use of sections, but this 
space was divided up according to the structure of branches and sections, with each section 
normally able to access only its “own” information. That is, little advantage was taken of 
the potential of IT to enable and facilitate the wider sharing and dissemination of 
information.
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The CEO for his part never verbally addressed employees as a whole, or even a significant 
subset of employees, and communicated to all staff in writing only twice in a twelve month 
period. On one of these occasions he castigated employees for providing poor client 
service, on another he announced the appointment of a new director, applauding her strong 
scientific background. In some contrast, the CEO of the parent department had on at least 
six occasions in the same period personally sent messages to all departmental staff, and 
addressed several public gatherings to which all staff were invited, and which many 
attended. During the course of the study, an unsuccessful attempt was made by a key 
manager in the Organisation (the IT manager) to limit electronic access by staff to 
information originating from the parent department, on the grounds that it was inefficient 
to maintain full access.
When it did occur, communication from management to staff in the Organisation was often 
expressed in an authoritarian manner. As an example, an instruction issued by a scientific 
branch director to all Organisation staff read in part:
“An officer preparing correspondence must personally prepare the addressed 
envelope .... Before the letter is sent, a second officer must confirm personally that 
the letter is correctly addressed by checking the letter against other documents on 
the relevant departmental file, confirm personally that the envelope is correctly 
addressed, and sign in full and date the file copy as a record that the above have 
been undertaken.
“Prohibited Activities: Existing databases must not under any circumstances be used 
as the source of address for outwards mail. . .” (Instruction to staff 1996)
Besides being patronising in tone, this also reflected the fact that many of the Organisation’s 
databases contained unreliable data (this is discussed further below).
There was also a paucity of effective communication among organisational units. For 
example, an internal audit of the Organisation undertaken by the parent department in 1996 
included such comments as:
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“Staff often understand very little of the business of other areas and thus don’t have 
common ground for discussion. ..
“There is currently no mechanism to alert one area of [the Organisation] to action 
taking place in another with respect to a manufacturer or product, for example, that 
a product has been publicly recalled or is under surveillance. There have been cases 
where action by one branch has proved embarrassing to [the Organisation] because 
of action being undertaken at the same time by another branch.” (Audit report 1996)
The realities of the poor internal communication within the Organisation were discussed in 
this section. The following sections address in detail the application of information 
technology in the Organisation.
3.7 Information technology
Section 3.7 and its sub-sections address in detail the ways in which IT was perceived and 
applied in practice in the Organisation, covering the areas of IT service provision, IT 
governance, information systems, the IT section, the IT manager, a key earlier IT project 
initiated by the IT manager (the Linkages project) and IT strategic planning. IT strategic 
planning is then discussed in greater detail in terms of client/server computing (both in 
general and as an Organisation strategy promoted by the IT manager), the further 
development of the ITSP and the outcomes of the ITSP process. The theoretical 
approaches and literature introduced in Part 2 are applied where relevant in section 3.7, 
namely approaches to strategic planning (both rational and processual), organisational 
culture and IT governance.
3.7.1 Information technology service provision
There was a separation of responsibilities for the provision of IT services and related 
functions between the Organisation and its parent department. The Central IT division of 
the parent department (see Diagram 3) had primary responsibility for most phases of the 
Organisation’s major mainframe-based application systems, including most aspects of their
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analysis, design, development, implementation and maintenance. The “system managers” 
of the Organisation, although described as such, for the most part were responsible only for 
the user design, administration and operation of information systems - although the actual 
level of responsibility varied considerably among individuals. Supported by the IT policies 
of the parent department, Central IT effectively had a monopoly on the provision of most 
IT services to the Organisation, and there were no real alternatives available. Central IT 
also had primary responsibility for the provision to the Organisation of IT infrastructure 
(including midrange servers, personal computers, local area networks and 
telecommunications), desktop computing services (including word processing, electronic 
mail and spreadsheets), and “help desk” services. Central IT and its mainframe were located 
several kilometres away from the Organisation, and were connected to it by 
telecommunications links.
These responsibilities were documented in a service agreement between Central IT and the 
Organisation, which defined the services which Central IT should provide to the 
Organisation, the criteria for the services (including response times) and the charges which 
the Organisation had to pay. The service agreement was reviewed annually on the 
Organisation’s behalf by the IT manager, although it was the Organisation’s Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) who signed it. The service agreement was the basis of some 
conflict between the Organisation and Central IT, revolving around perceptions by some 
within the Organisation of poor service provision and overcharging by Central IT.
The monopolistic provision of IT services had led to a reliance by the Organisation on 
Central IT to manage many aspects of the Organisation’s IT, in a manner which went 
beyond that of a typical commercial service provider. Some examples of this follow. 
Although in principle the branches of the Organisation specified the business requirements 
for their systems and Central IT responded with technical solutions, in fact Central IT also 
had significant involvement in interpreting the business requirements. This was partly due 
to the fact that Central IT possessed formal business analysis skills whereas the Organisation 
did not, and partly due to a lack of IT sophistication on the part of the Organisation. The
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resources and time needed for individual IT projects and tasks were estimated and allocated 
by Central IT, largely outside the Organisation’s control. The testing of systems was largely 
undertaken by Central IT, in the absence of rigorous acceptance testing by the Organisation. 
When a fault was detected in a system, the relevant branch of the Organisation would 
usually refer it directly to Central IT, with little attempt to analyse its implications first.
Central IT also controlled most aspects of the Organisation’s desktop computing, and 
exercised their rights in a manner seen as arbitrary by some within the Organisation. This 
caused some friction, for example, when software upgrades were issued by Central IT to all 
desktop platforms using an automatic process, all PC software which was not deemed 
“approved” was culled, including some software supplied legitimately by other public sector 
organisations.
In regard to service provision, an audit of the Organisation undertaken by the parent 
department included some revealing comments:
“An issue of great concern within [the Organisation] is the perceived poor service 
provided by [Central IT]. They cite a history of projects which have not delivered 
what was required, which were significantly over time and over budget, [or] which 
were developed with unsuitable technology.... Staff from [Central IT] believe, on 
the other hand, that [Organisation] staff are not prepared to contribute sufficient 
resources to understanding and specifying their business requirements, to conducting 
thorough testing and to maintaining the systems once they are in operation....” 
(Audit report 1996)
The nett effect was that the role of Central IT was paternalistic, and the role of the 
Organisation one of relative dependence. Central IT was always there to “patch up” a 
problem in some way, even if the solution was expensive, not ideal or not in the 
Organisation’s long-term interests. There was some resentment of Central IT’s paternalistic 
and sometimes authoritarian manner, which was however at least partially created by the 
Organisation’s own attitude of dependence.
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The provision of IT services to the Organisation was outlined in this section, including the 
paternalistic role of the main IT service provider. The way in which IT was governed in the 
Organisation is addressed in the next section.
3.7.2 Information technology governance
The concepts of IT governance, organisational culture, emergent strategy and the processual 
school of strategy formation were introduced and discussed in Part 2. These are applied as 
necessary in this section to clarify the way in which IT was governed in the Organisation.
The Organisation’s style of IT governance was largely implicit and undocumented (e.g. 
Shipley 1995; section 2.5). Much of the IT governance framework emerged from the 
backdrop of the organisational structure and organisational culture (e.g. Duncan 1995; 
section 2.4.1), fitted well within both, and reinforced their tenets. Over the years, the 
Organisation’s dependence on Central IT had held it back in terms of IT. It had not been 
conducive to any critical examination of the IT environment, to the development of a mature 
approach to IT, nor to the acquisition of highly qualified IT personnel. The last applied to 
many of the system managers. Nevertheless most of these employees had substantial 
practical expertise within their particular areas of responsibility, based mainly on local 
experience. However within the Organisation, IT in general lacked the status and prestige 
accorded to the scientific disciplines. Some of the system managers also had scientific roles 
or backgrounds, while many worked with or were supervised by scientists. IT was seen as 
a basic infrastructure necessary to support the “real” scientific business of the Organisation, 
but not an integral part of it. For example, some Organisation publicity material referred to 
the “professional staff’ which it employed, but listed only scientific disciplines. In this 
material IT did not even rate a mention under the categories of “support staff’ which were 
also listed.
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The CEO was essentially ineffective in terms of IT, accepting no explicit IT role or 
responsibilities, and having little knowledge or background in IT. The director of General 
Services branch had certain overall IT responsibilities, and was in effect the CIO. However 
he in turn had no extensive knowledge of IT, and by default many IT responsibilities were 
delegated to his subordinate, the IT manager. Both the CEO and the CIO had a fairly 
simplistic perception of IT as being simply a necessary supporting infrastructure which 
required close attention to costs - somewhat akin to telephone services. Neither had a 
strong conception of IT’s potential role in supporting, enabling or creating business strategy 
(for example, as noted by Henderson and Venkatraman 1993). The IT manager headed a 
small IT section (in General Services branch) which had responsibility for coordinating and 
to some extent managing the provision of common IT services and facilities within the 
Organisation.
An IT steering committee in the Organisation consisting of senior managers oversighted all 
IT activities and projects. The CIO chaired this committee, but it was largely irrelevant and 
ineffective in terms of considering IT policies or strategies, or making decisions of any real 
consequence. The CIO was seen as irretrievably aligned with his General Services branch, 
which moreover did not have the organisational status of the other branches as it was not 
scientifically based. The steering committee was therefore seen as aligned with one branch 
only, and not a significant one at that. The committee also had no formal charter or 
responsibilities, no well-defined membership, and no fixed meeting schedule. It met 
essentially on an ad hoc basis, and when it did meet, formal minutes were rarely produced. 
Also when it met, the scientific branch directors often sent varying numbers of their section 
managers or system managers to represent them. The directors themselves had little interest 
in or knowledge of IT. Certainly, they had no real commitment to the integration of 
information systems across branches. One employee described his branch director’s attitude 
to IT as entailing, “You just tell [Central IT] what you need, and they do it - it’s their 
problem.” As such the steering committee often became a forum for arguments among 
system managers, which frequently went unresolved. As an illustration of the lack of 
decisiveness of the steering committee, the IT manager could later claim that the committee
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had supported a significant IT project (“Linkages” - see section 3.7.6 below), whereas some 
system managers could claim the committee had discontinued it.
Most significant decisions on information systems were made independently by the 
Organisation’s branches, including their initial planning, user design, administration, 
operation, and the need for maintenance and review. Each of the six branches had its own 
IT staff to represent its interests, generally including one or more system managers and one 
or more “owner managers”. Each of the ten system managers had certain technically- 
oriented responsibilities for one or more of the 22 key application systems, and each of the 
twelve “owner managers” had certain business-oriented responsibilities for one or more 
systems. Despite their title, the owner managers had mainly operational responsibilities, 
such as ensuring the regular update of data and generating reports. However neither the 
system managers nor the owner managers had clearly defined roles, and there was 
considerable overlap among their responsibilities and differences among branches. Many 
of these positions were part-time as regards systems work, varying from around ten to 
ninety per cent. The system managers in general were considerably more influential in terms 
of systems than the owner managers.
These staff positions were mainly focussed on IT issues relevant to their “own” areas - there 
was little Organisation-wide focus. A typical comment by employees was: “What do we 
need a [corporate] IT section for anyway? We each do our own.” The power of the 
branches on IT matters pertaining to their individual areas was vested mainly in the system 
managers. This gave the system managers considerable influence over IT matters within 
their respective areas, and collectively, over much of the Organisation’s use of IT. The 
system managers constituted the vital core of the implicit IT governance framework. In 
terms of the model of Diagram 2 (in Part 2), the structure and culture of the Organisation 
significantly influenced the perceptions of the system managers and hence the IT 
governance. This in turn reinforced the principles of the organisational structure and 
culture.
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The system managers did form a loose-knit network, which occasionally met to discuss 
broader IT issues. However this network had no formal role or charter. The network was 
coordinated by the IT manager, but in the twelve month period of 1995-96 it met as a lull 
group only about four times. This was largely deliberate on the part of the IT manager, who 
chose not to risk encouraging the development of a more cohesive, potentially more 
powerful group. He commented, “If I let them get together too often they only gang up on 
me.” This reflected both his apprehension that the system managers may collectively oppose 
his decisions, and also an awareness that they would only be likely to collaborate effectively 
across branch boundaries if they were brought together by some external means. 
Nevertheless within the IT governance framework, it was legitimate to discuss and even 
decide issues within small technical groups. This was in keeping with the wider 
organisational culture, in which it was acceptable for scientific decisions to be made within 
small, expert groups. It was therefore reasonably common for two or three system 
managers to meet with the aim of resolving a joint issue, although usually this only occurred 
within one branch. However such meetings often failed to achieve full resolution of the 
issues.
The service agreement between the Organisation and Central IT (see section 3.7.1) was one 
of the few explicit signposts within the IT governance framework. However it was silent 
as regards which areas within the Organisation were the actual clients of Central IT, leaving 
the way open for the individual branches of the Organisation to arrange directly with Central 
IT to develop and maintain their information systems on a largely independent basis. For 
example, the service agreement did not identify the IT manager as the primary point of 
contact in the Organisation. Central IT did follow a broad system development 
methodology based on software engineering principles, but this also was silent in terms of 
defining clear roles and responsibilities for the various activities.
In this respect, the Organisation’s structure and culture filled the void, by moulding the 
implicit aspects of the IT governance framework, including the control over information 
systems which formed its most important part. These were in fact emergent strategies, in
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Mintzberg’s terms (e.g. Mintzberg and Waters 1985). They did not stem from any 
particular initiative or action within the organisation, but were shaped by the dominant 
organisational culture. The IT governance fell within the broad approach of the processual 
school of strategy formation (e.g. Mintzberg 1978, 1994; see section 2.3.2), to the extent 
that it emerged from the foundation of the Organisation’s cultural values and processes. In 
regard to the model of Diagram 2 (in Part 2), the organisational culture and structure largely 
shaped the IT governance.
Mintzberg (1994: 412-413) notes that organisations which in effect have strong internal 
cultures tend to reject formal strategic planning, but rather rely for overall coordination on 
the application of cultural norms. The experience of the Organisation supports this view. 
Mintzberg also notes that organisations sometimes complement their emergent strategies 
by pursuing “umbrella” strategies, with the broad outlines being deliberate while the details 
are allowed to emerge (1994: 209-210). At least in terms of control over information 
systems, it could be said that the Organisation pursued no formal, documented IS strategy 
at all, but left it entirely to emerge from lower-level understandings and decisions.
The style of IT governance operating within the Organisation was described in this section. 
The next section discusses in more detail the nature of the information systems of the 
Organisation.
3.7.3 Information systems
In the context of this thesis, information systems are seen as a major subset of the broader 
span of IT within the Organisation. This section focusses on their nature, applying where 
relevant the theoretical concepts of organisational culture and emergent strategy (as 
discussed in Part 2) to their interpretation. The term “information system” denotes a 
computer-based system, its set of users (including those who enter data and those who 
access information) and their associated manual processes. For convenience, “information
61
IT Strategic Planning - A Case Study
system” in this thesis is often used to refer mainly to the computer system component - but 
the wider context is also implied.
The Organisation’s IT was seen by many employees as being merely a “support activity” 
(Earl 1989: 5-6), with low strategic impact and only occasionally requiring senior 
management attention. Many of the information systems were “Type 1” legacy systems in 
the terms of Lo (1991), that is, they resulted mainly from the simplistic automation of pre­
existing clerical and administrative procedures within the respective branches and units 
(Remenyi 1996: 84). In many cases this had come about from a combination of failure to 
fully analyse business needs, and delegation of the task of specifying system requirements 
to local operational staff, who often saw no real alternative to the existing work practices.
Many of the systems, although simple in conception, were themselves reasonably large and 
complex, with a typical size of around 50 to 80 thousand lines of code, with around 1000 
to 1500 function points. Most of the systems were developed using a proprietary 
mainframe-based non-relational database management system, which was not conducive to 
extensive integration among the different application systems, nor to the production of 
higher-level management information. Many of the systems also were not seen as being 
“user friendly”, were difficult to understand, use and modify, and had a high cost of 
maintenance.
Each system provided little in the way of meaningful management information - even 
relevant to its own organisational unit, let alone higher levels of information across units. 
There were only a few systems which approached being “Type 2” in the terms of Lo (1991), 
that is, more sophisticated systems which could provide assistance with non-routine policy 
tasks, and which could provide meaningful management information, both within and across 
organisational boundaries. Similarly the systems had not been designed to support 
enterprise integration (e.g. Janet 1996), and no real attempt had ever been made to achieve 
this.
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The information systems had been developed largely as separate “islands of automation” in 
each of the branches and even in many sections, with little overall integration or 
commonality. In some cases this had come about when a predecessor of the Organisation 
developed a system independently, but most systems were developed after the Organisation 
was formed as such in 1989. Subsequently the systems had evolved separately in response 
to the emerging needs of individual branches and changing legislation.
Even though most of the Organisation’s corporate systems were developed and maintained 
by Central IT division, they were still largely independent. That is, Central IT had 
responded individually to the business requirements of the different organisational units. 
Although superficially many systems had similar user interfaces, many of their basic 
conceptual schemas differed (Nijssen and Halpin 1989), and so many of their interpretations 
of data and database structures differed. As a result, intercommunication among the systems 
was difficult. This situation stemmed largely from a failure to identify key categories of 
common corporate data, and to establish policies to manage them effectively. For example, 
an audit undertaken by the parent department commented on the “lack of a corporate data 
model and identification of key data, its characteristics and appropriate ‘owner’” (Audit 
report 1996). In any case, it would have been difficult to develop a meaningful corporate 
data model, given the fragmentation of database structures and related responsibilities.
The desktop software environment was reasonably standard as it was provided and 
supported by Central IT, but even in this respect the Organisation had chosen to use a 
different configuration of servers from the parent department. Some sections of the 
Organisation also elected to use non-standard, unsupported packages including word 
processors, spreadsheets and database management. It was also reasonably common for 
users in the Organisation to alter, or attempt to alter the standard configuration of 
equipment supported by Central IT.
Little attention was paid to the quality of many of the systems as they were developed. A 
complete software quality management system was available to both Central IT and the
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Organisation, but had lain dormant for years, following an earlier decision by Central IT that 
quality assurance was the responsibility of user areas. As a result there was no formal 
quality management, and few thorough reviews of system components were undertaken as 
they were developed. Consequently there were fundamental defects in many systems, as 
illustrated by comments from an audit of one system:
“.... errors in the operation of the database.... In some cases standard reports are 
known to be consistently inaccurate.... There are some problems with unreliable and 
inflexible reporting and with data integrity. In addition the system is complex and 
not user friendly which impairs its usefulness. There is no user documentation or 
system training and this contributes to the difficulties of using the system 
effectively... Data was loaded on to the new system without being fully checked...” 
(Audit report 1996)
There was also a multiplicity of smaller systems within many branches, developed 
independently to meet the needs of specific organisational units. These were based on a 
variety of commercial packages, including database management systems, spreadsheets and 
scientific software packages. The Organisation’s IT manager and the official system 
managers generally had little knowledge of or influence over these systems. While the 
smaller systems were nominally “independent” in that they did not have automated links to 
any other systems, many of them replicated processes performed elsewhere or data held 
elsewhere.
In some cases the smaller systems reflected the fact that many scientists in general have long 
been closely involved in the development of their own systems. For example, in the 1970s 
scientists typically had a comparable level of programming ability to computing staff in 
scientific languages such as Fortran, and often wrote their own programs (personal 
observation). This attitude persisted in some scientific areas of the Organisation, and was 
reflected in a fairly high level of end-user systems development (compare Lo 1991: 34).
The evaluation and approval by the Organisation of a product submitted by a private 
company typically involved multiple procedures carried out by various branches, sections
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and systems - some in sequence and some in parallel. When procedures or workflows 
crossed from one information system to another, data often had to be re-entered in different 
formats and with different meanings - all of which was time-consuming, error-prone and 
inefficient. For example, after evaluation, the details of all approved products were recorded 
in a register, which was partly computer-based and partly paper-based. The employees of 
the section which maintained the register usually had to enter many of the details afresh, 
even though the product had earlier been recorded in various systems. A single product as 
recorded in one system could be treated by other systems as a varying number of different 
products with an assortment of names. Moreover when the data in one system was 
subsequently updated, other areas might not be aware of the change, resulting in their 
systems containing inaccurate data.
The lack of corporate integration among information systems was reflected in an audit 
report, which included comments such as:
“Since 1987 there has been little success in developing integrated systems and data 
structures in [the Organisation], Instead, separate systems have been developed on 
an ad hoc basis, with attempts made after the event to co-ordinate at a fairly low 
level. Most areas appear to have developed their own databases to hold information 
which is relevant to their specific work interests. ..” (Audit report 1996)
The Organisation also had a multiplicity of “sub-registries” for holding paper files and 
records, generally following the structure of branches and sections. The data held in many 
systems was supported extensively by paperwork, largely as a result of deficiencies in the 
text handling capability of the systems. Information was frequently duplicated across the 
largely independent holdings, and such information was often also inconsistent. When it was 
necessary to uncover all known information on a certain product, it was common to find 
separate records in systems and paper files in many different areas, with no central register 
and little accurate cross referencing. One employee commented, “If someone rings up and 
wants to know everything about a particular product, I have to go around all the branches 
and sections one by one, asking each one of them if they have anything on it. It’s not
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unusual to find up to 20 files or so with some information on the same thing.” Moreover 
control over file movements was poor, and during the study messages asking for assistance 
in locating missing files were broadcast to all employees on about a fortnightly basis.
The various branches and sections were described by some employees as “stovepipes”, 
implying that their functions were largely independent. One employee commented that “The 
work we do isn’t connected very much to anyone else’s - after we finish it just goes up in 
smoke.” This was parallelled by the fact that, looking from an external perspective, the 
Organisation as a whole had been described as a “stovepipe” of the parent department, by 
its CEO (Departmental report 1996).
The separate systems and processes were deeply entrenched, and one employee commented, 
“They’re so bedded down now that it’d be almost impossible to change them.” The audit 
report commented that the situation “may also be a reflection of a cultural situation which 
needs addressing....” (Audit report 1996). This was one of the few instances in which it was 
recognised that cultural factors were significant organisational issues - but the report offered 
no suggestions for addressing them.
Essentially the nature of the Organisation’s information systems and related procedures 
constituted an unformalised, emergent strategy (e.g. Mintzberg 1994: 25, as discussed in 
section 2.3.2) - that is, an overall strategy did exist but it had not been expressly intended 
or planned as such. The process by which the strategy came to be widely adopted within 
the Organisation (in the absence of any formal strategy being promulgated by management) 
was related to the informal sharing and learning of values within the organisational culture, 
among its members (as discussed in section 2.4.1). In terms of the model presented in 
Diagram 2 (in Part 2), the Organisation’s culture and structure significantly shaped the 
nature of the information systems and the implicit IT strategy. These in turn reinforced the 
precepts of the organisational culture and structure.
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The nature of the information systems of the Organisation was analysed in this section. The 
key role of the Organisation’s IT section is outlined below.
3.7.4 Information technology section
The General Services branch had particular responsibilities for IT, but these were effectively 
delegated mainly to its IT section. The main responsibility for the coordination and overall 
management of IT in the Organisation (to the extent this was achieved) fell to this section 
and its manager. The objective of the IT section was to ensure that the Organisation’s 
overall IT aim was achieved. It attempted to meet this largely by coordinating and 
monitoring the provision of services by Central IT under the service agreement.
The overall aim of the IT function within the Organisation was stated in 1995 as “to support 
the cost-effective achievement of the strategic goals and objectives of the [Organisation] and 
its components by the ingenious and intelligent application of information technology” (IT 
section role statement). In terms of supporting the achievement of the goals of the 
organisational units - as understood by them on an individual basis - the IT function had 
been relatively successful. That is, the units in fact had their systems, although they also 
perceived many deficiencies in them. However in terms of supporting the achievement of 
corporate goals, the IT function had been largely unsuccessful. For example, it provided 
little support for the corporate teamwork and coordination called for by the strategic 
management plan of 1994 (see section 3.6). In terms of the “ingenious and intelligent” 
application of IT, the IT function was also unsuccessful, as judged by the preponderance of 
unsophisticated Type 1 systems over Type 2 (see section 3.7.3).
The IT section’s most significant player was its IT manager, and the role of this key 
individual is examined further below.
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3.7.5 Information technology manager
This section focusses on the critical role, management style and practice of the IT manager. 
The theoretical concepts of organisational culture and IT governance (as discussed in Part 
2) are drawn on to assist in explication.
Since the amalgamation of bodies in 1989 to create the Organisation in the form studied, the 
role of the IT section and its IT manager (or earlier, “IT coordinator”) had been restricted 
largely to relatively mundane responsibilities such as monitoring the IT service agreement, 
IT asset management, desktop computing, telephone services and limited coordination of 
work on the Organisation’s information systems (maintenance, enhancement and some 
development), within the terms of the service agreement with Central IT.
The role of the IT section was broadly technological, but it could not accurately be 
described as “applied scientific” in the way the scientific units of the Organisation could be 
so described. The IT manager at the time of study had been appointed in 1994 by the CIO. 
The CIO had little understanding of IT (as noted above), and was said by some employees 
to have “cloned” the IT manager in his own likeness. The IT manager also had little 
professional experience in IT, but did have earlier experience as a system manager and user 
within the Organisation. The reason for the CIO's decision lay at least partly in the fact that 
since most IT services were provided by Central IT as a virtual monopoly, there was little 
incentive to seek substantial IT experience, and more incentive to seek demonstrated local 
knowledge of the Organisation’s information systems. The decision was also consistent 
with the implicit IT governance (e.g. Shipley 1995; section 2.5) and the organisational 
culture (e.g. Duncan 1995; section 2.4.1) - in terms of the influence of branches and their 
systems (as discussed in section 3.7.2).
The new IT manager soon displayed a distinctly “technologically autocratic”, or 
“technocratic” style apparently modelled on the scientific autocracy of the prevailing
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organisational culture, based on his previous immersion in it within the Organisation. He 
had been personally exposed to autocratic scientific managers, and as a consequence had 
evidently adopted their general attitude and style. An example of his technocratic style is 
given below in relation to a stores inventory system. Further examples are described later, 
such as in the context of the Linkages project (see section 3.7.6) and the IT strategic 
planning process (see section 3.7.7).
In the normal course of events a new manager’s successful assimilation of the prevailing 
cultural values would be a beneficial strategy, whether deliberate or unconscious, and would 
result in greater acceptance of the manager by the members of the culture. The autocratic 
style in general was accepted from scientific managers within the Organisation, and was in 
most cases supported by known competence and experience. However the IT manager’s 
style was not generally acknowledged as being backed up by substantial IT experience or 
qualifications. His style also included selective release and withholding of key information 
and knowledge, again a trait generally in keeping with the organisational culture. The fact 
that a large part of the IT governance framework was implicit also often worked to his 
advantage. For example, when a branch’s decision supported his strategic objective (such 
as a decision to redevelop a system in a client/server form) he would publicise it, but he 
would withhold contrary decisions made by other branches (see below).
Initially the IT manager’s technocratic style was applied mainly to fairly low-level IT 
decisions, which although they upset many, did not have major consequences for the 
Organisation as a whole. For example, in 1994 he personally selected an information system 
designed to manage the inventory of stores, based on a commercial PC package. He made 
this decision without consulting most of the key stakeholders and users. His main motive 
was to enable the Organisation to move its stores system away from the parent department’s 
mainframe, and potentially make significant cost savings. The new system was installed, but 
did not meet the actual needs of the users. Among other things, it required customisation 
and lacked a necessary multi-user capability. The outcome was that the system was never 
used, and an ongoing legacy of mutual mistrust was established between the parties
69
IT Strategic Planning - A Case Study
involved.
The general style of the key IT player in the Organisation - the IT manager - was discussed 
in this section. Some of his most significant earlier decisions and actions are examined in 
the next section.
3.7.6 System linkages project
This section describes and analyses a key earlier project initiated and undertaken by the IT 
manager. The concepts of organisational culture and IT governance (introduced in Part 2) 
are applied as necessary to aid interpretation.
A more substantial decision made by the IT manager in 1994 was to initiate a “Linkages” 
project designed to develop software gateways between some of the Organisation’s key 
information systems (Brodie 1993: 17), with the aim of achieving enhanced 
intercommunication and data exchange among them. The stated aims of the Linkages 
project were to reduce the level of duplication of data across the various systems, and 
reduce the manual re-entry of data into different systems. The project had only fairly limited 
ambitions, and each system was to remain largely unchanged from the users’ viewpoint. 
Even with these limited objectives, the project underestimated the difficulty of achieving 
compatibility in data interchange among the systems. Because the systems were not based 
on relational databases, the task of making them intercommunicate was made more difficult.
The Linkages project conformed generally to the IT manager’s perceptions within the IT 
governance framework (e.g. Shipley 1995; section 2.5), as regards the independence of 
branches and their systems (as discussed in section 3.7.2). Nevertheless the implicit, 
unstated aims of the project were to achieve a greater (albeit limited) degree of coordination 
and integration across systems, and therefore across branches. This essentially confronted 
and challenged the autonomy of individual branches and their systems - intrinsic components
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of the implicit IT governance, the organisational structure and organisational culture (see 
section 3.7.2). Neither the IT manager nor any business managers made any significant 
attempt to reengineer the business processes involved, including their manual components 
(Hammer 1990) - but this would have been essential for the project to be successful. There 
was also little attention given to the proper management of technological change, and its 
associated requirements (e g. Brewer 1995; Preece 1995).
The Linkages project was seen by many as an imposed and inappropriate technological 
solution to a situation which was not even widely agreed on as being a deficiency. Some 
areas made written submissions to this effect, saying that their current systems were 
completely satisfactory to them, and that there was no business requirement to change them. 
One system manager commented that the Linkages project had initially concentrated on the 
technical aspects of system development, to the virtual exclusion of consideration of existing 
business processes, how they differed across branches and how they would need to be 
changed. The project management team consisted solely of the IT manager and Central IT 
professionals - no actual users were included in it.
One system manager said, “The project was nearly finished before they got around to 
tackling the problem of different areas having different interpretations of the same thing.” 
At that stage a number of system managers and users were asked to put in a substantial 
effort to overcome this problem. Because they had not been warned of this earlier, they saw 
it as a great imposition, and there was no consensus on how it should be addressed. One 
system manager said, “I spent weeks in meetings trying to get the users from four branches 
to see eye to eye. They couldn’t even agree on how to enter the definition of a product - 
the most basic item of data we have. One would want to put it one way, the others were 
different. None of them would budge an inch. They said, ‘that’s the way we do it now, and 
that’s the way it has to be.’ I went round and round with them all on that, with no success. 
That was about the time I realised the project was doomed. I was glad to get out of it.”
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At one point the IT manager was absent, and a certain system manager temporarily replaced 
him as Linkages project manager. The system manager reported that he found the project 
documentation and monitoring mechanisms insufficient, and also questioned the assumed 
benefits in relation to the effort required. He documented his findings and reported them 
to senior management, and recommended the project’s termination.
The technocratic style of the IT manager, his failure to adequately consult or involve 
stakeholders, his secrecy concerning the details of the Linkages project and his inadequate 
project management all did nothing to raise the level of acceptance of the project within the 
Organisation. The outcome was that after running for about twelve months the project was 
strongly questioned and eventually opposed by both system managers and business 
managers, and was ultimately shelved by senior management.
The project had only limited objectives and yet was resisted by its major stakeholders, 
influenced and informed by the prevailing values of the IT governance and the organisational 
culture. From their perspective, the project did not make good sense, was threatening and 
was therefore opposed. If it was to be successful, it would have required a much greater 
degree of commitment by managers at all levels. If the project had attempted to integrate 
processes and systems on a larger scale, for example in the form of enterprise integration 
(Janet 1996; Mink et al. 1991), it would most probably have been resisted even more 
strongly.
Majchrzak and Wang (1996: 93-95) describe the considerable difficulty of “breaking the 
mind-set” (that is, changing the cultural values) of organisations which are structured around 
discrete “functional silos”. They also found in their applied research that if such 
organisations are for some reason unable to create a fully collaborative culture with a 
collective sense of responsibility, they may benefit more from simply strengthening the ties 
between functions, than from more extensive attempts to integrate functions and data 
(Majchrzak and Wang 1996: 95-96). This implies that from an objective viewpoint, the
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Linkages project was reasonably sound in its basic concept. This was supported by the fact 
that an external audit carried out in 1996 recommended the reinstatement and completion 
o f the project. However from the perspectives of internal employees, it was seen as 
unsound.
The general behaviour of the IT manager was tolerated for some time, but with rising 
frustration on the part of those affected. During 1995 and 1996 his unsubstantiated 
technocratic style was increasingly strenuously opposed. This opposition coincided with his 
championing of a particular technology (client/server computing), which he proposed as the 
Organisation’s future principal IT strategy, and which he made the centrepiece of a draft IT 
strategic plan produced for the Organisation (discussed further below).
The IT manager’s perceptions and practice as revealed through a key earlier IT project were 
critically examined in this section. The initial stages of the IT strategic planning process, in 
which the IT manager was also a key player, are the subject of the next section.
3.7.7 Information technology strategic planning
This section describes and analyses the initial stages of the approach to IT strategic planning 
taken by the Organisation. The theoretical concepts of symbolism and the rational approach 
to strategic planning (introduced in Part 2) are utilised as necessary, to aid understanding. 
It is noted that the Organisation initially aimed to follow the government’s guidelines for 
ITSP. These are identified as falling firmly within the rational approach, and are criticised 
as such.
After the shelving of the Linkages project and partly as a result of this, an attempt was made 
in late 1995 by the IT manager, with the support of the CIO, to expand the role of the IT 
section, to include:
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“ coordination and participation in the planning and management of all IT activities 
undertaken within or for the [Organisation]; and
. planning and development of [Organisation] specific policies on IT matters and 
managing their implementation.” (IT section role statement 1995)
It was also proposed that the IT section would increase its emphasis on the introduction of 
new technologies into the workplace. All of these proposals amounted to an attempt by the 
IT manager to institute - again albeit in a limited way - a stronger corporate role for the IT 
section with correspondingly increased powers, and a greater degree of coordination and 
integration of IT across the Organisation. The proposed new role of the IT section, and in 
particular its corporate IT planning function, represented a significant change from the 
prevailing situation in which each branch had primary responsibility for planning its own IT 
functions and services. There was a considerable degree of tension and some overt conflict 
in the Organisation concerning the proposal. In public, the system managers simply 
questioned the need for a stronger corporate IT focus, arguing that if any function needed 
more support and resources, it was theirs. However a typical private comment concerning 
the IT manager was, “He’s just trying to build an empire for himself, but we simply don’t 
need it.”
The proposed role statement for the IT section added that:
“This change will mean that system managers and their section managers will assume 
more responsibility and accountability for their use of systems and local management 
o f IT in their area. .. The prime responsibility for optimising work practices, 
including the application of IT.... will remain with line areas.” (IT section role 
statement 1995)
These additional role statements were curiously inconsistent with the proposed corporate 
role of the IT section, but in fact reflected a recognition by the IT manager of the continuing 
major role of the branches within the IT governance framework. They also served to 
underline the fact that the IT manager’s perceptions also remained to a large extent firmly 
within that framework.
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Since 1987, government agencies had been requested to develop a corporate information 
technology plan covering three years, and to review it regularly. Guidelines were issued to 
assist agencies in this process, entitled “Developing a business driven IT strategy” (Finance 
1991). These guidelines strongly emphasised the role of “business” in the development of 
an ITSP, with this term being a synonym for the raison d'etre of the agency (Finance 1991: 
7). The guidelines were strongly recommended, but were not mandatory. The guidelines 
were re-issued in 1995 by the central IT policy agency at the time, the Office of Government 
IT. They were based on a similar approach to IT strategic planning developed in the United 
Kingdom by the government agency with overall responsibility for IT (CCTA 1988, 1989).
The government’s guidelines dealt only with IT strategic planning, but encouraged agencies 
to plan for IT in the context of their entire information activities, that is, within a “Total 
Information Management” context. The guidelines aimed to closely integrate corporate and 
IT planning by focussing initially on business needs and objectives, and then identifying the 
optimum IT strategies which could fulfil and complement them (Finance 1991: 1-7). The 
guidelines noted that the ITSP process was iterative in nature, and depended on monitoring 
the performance of the chosen strategies, comparing them against previously defined 
business and IT performance indicators and adjusting the strategies as necessary. The 
guidelines also aimed to focus on strategic as opposed to operational issues, without 
however offering a means of distinguishing between the two, or even acknowledging that 
there was any potential difficulty in doing so (compare Rumelt 1979: 197; discussed in 
section 2.3.1).
All IT strategic planning for the Organisation had previously been undertaken by the Central 
IT division of the parent department, which included rudimentary IT plans for the 
Organisation within its wider departmental IT plan. The approach taken to the 
Organisation’s IT needs could be described as “minimalist”, that is, the previous plans had 
envisaged only ongoing routine maintenance and support of the Organisation’s systems, to 
be implemented with minimum effort. No overall vision or fundamental change to the 
Organisation’s future IT environment was expressed or apparently even contemplated.
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In 1995 the Organisation’s IT steering committee noted that the previous ITSP for the 
Organisation (produced in 1993 and included in the parent department's ITSP for 1993-96) 
was no longer fully relevant to the needs of the Organisation. It was decided that the 
Organisation should develop its own ITSP, which would complement the business strategies 
and plans of both the Organisation and the parent department. The ITSP process originally 
aimed to support the business directions of the Organisation as outlined in its strategic 
management plan of 1994, including enhanced cooperation, communication and teamwork 
among the branches and sections. It was originally envisaged that the process would include 
consultation with all relevant stakeholders, including branches, committees, clients and the 
parent department. Where possible active participation and contributions would be sought.
In addition to dissatisfaction with the earlier approach to ITSP taken by Central IT, the 
ITSP process was initiated for several reasons, including the impetus of the Organisation’s 
1994 corporate strategic plan, which placed some pressure on management to develop a 
corresponding IT strategic plan. There was also some degree of rising dissatisfaction within 
the Organisation over the inadequacies of its simplistic “Type 1” information systems - 
which was itself linked to the dissatisfaction with Central IT. However this focussed mainly 
on the deficiencies of individual systems, and did not extend to any widely shared perception 
of a need to better integrate and coordinate them.
The government’s ITSP guidelines proposed a set of “fundamental principles” of IT 
strategic planning, namely that ITSP:
(a) is the concern of corporate senior managers,
(b) is one element in an integrated business planning process,
(c) provides valuable input to the business planning process,
(d) is driven by business information needs and flows rather than the technology,
(e) is driven by user-defined needs and priorities,
(f) is directly based upon and supports business objectives,
(g) demonstrates measurable benefits to the agency,
(h) is owned by the users, is readily understandable by all agency staff, and has the
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commitment of the IT providers,
(i) reflects the size, structure, IT skills and maturity of the agency and the importance 
of IT to that agency,
(j) is capable of guiding the development of the strategy on an ongoing basis,
(k) drives the operational IT plans,
(l) is primarily the agency’s internal management tool, produced for the benefit of the 
agency, and
(m) is consistent with government IT policies (Finance 1991: 8-10).
Initially the ITSP process aimed to follow the government guidelines. However this 
approach was effectively undermined in the Organisation by the IT manager, who acted to 
severely limit the involvement of senior managers and business managers in the process. In 
fact his approach ignored or paid only lip service to many of the fundamental principles of 
the government’s ITSP approach, namely all of principles (a) to (h) above.
The ITSP process in the Organisation was driven by the IT manager with the tacit support 
of the CIO, but without significant support from any other directors or managers. The IT 
manager manipulated “ITSP” as a private symbol or emblem in many situations (e.g. Firth 
1973; see section 2.4.2) - that is, when he referred to it in discourse he implied certain 
connotations and understandings without explicitly identifying them. These understandings 
were not general in the way that cultural symbols have common meanings shared by many 
members of the culture (as discussed in section 2.4.2). They had been privately formulated 
by the IT manager - however he sought to promote and propagate them more widely. For 
him, the connotations of “ITSP” as an emblem included:
. an assertion of a greater degree of autonomy of the Organisation, and greater 
independence from Central IT on IT matters;
. enhanced maturity and professionalism of the Organisation in terms of IT;
. a potentially expanded role and responsibilities for both the IT section and the 
General Services branch; and
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• potentially enhanced status and prestige for both the IT manager and the CIO.
Although the IT manager would not openly declare his understandings of TTSP”, he would 
discuss them privately to some extent with the IT section and the researcher. Perhaps 
predictably, when the system managers gained an idea of what his understandings were, they 
reacted in a manner similar to their earlier response to the proposed expanded corporate role 
of the IT section. A typical comment concerning the IT manager’s desire for independence 
from Central IT was, “The simple fact is, the [Organisation] is part of the department, and 
we get our IT from [Central IT] - and that’s all there is to it. It doesn’t matter what some 
people go around saying, that’s the way it is.” For the system managers, the connotations 
of ‘TTSP” as an emblem therefore included:
. potentially enhanced status and power for both the IT manager and the CIO;
. potentially increased resources for both the IT section and the General Services
branch;
. potentially reduced status and influence for the system managers; and
. potentially reduced resources for the system managers and the branches.
The IT manager also used reference to “ITSP” as an emblem as a means of promoting the 
technology which he had preconceived as an ideal solution for the Organisation and as its 
principal IT strategy: migration to a client/server computing environment (this is discussed 
further below).
A small working party was set up to coordinate and undertake most of the work of 
developing an ITSP for the Organisation. This consisted of the IT manager, the assistant 
IT manager and a system manager. At the suggestion of the assistant IT manager, the 
process initially aimed to follow the government’s “rational” ITSP guidelines (Finance 
1991). Accordingly it was initially agreed that the ITSP would be developed by means of 
a process which included addressing the following questions, in logical order:
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. Where are we now?
. What’s good and bad about this situation?
. Where should we go, and why?
. How should we get there?
. How will we know we’re getting there?
The ITSP development project therefore initially aimed to include the following broad 
phases:
(a) Investigate the current environment o f the Organisation
The current internal and external environments of the Organisation would be 
investigated and documented, covering both business and technical aspects. This 
would include aspects controlled by both the Organisation and by Central IT.
(b) Assess the current environment o f the Organisation
This would aim to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the internal environment, 
and judge the potential opportunities and threats posed by the external environment.
(c) Identify the target environment o f the Organisation
This would aim to identify the most important business and technical strategic forces 
and imperatives, leading on to the identification of key strategic directions. The 
various possible target environments which could fulfil these strategic directions 
would be identified. For each possible target environment the advantages and 
disadvantages (from both the business and technical perspectives) would be 
considered. This would consider the impacts on the Organisation, the 
Organisation’s clients and the parent department. The preferred target environment 
would then be identified and defined.
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(d) Identify strategies for reaching the target environment
Various possible strategies would be identified and assessed, considering the 
potential advantages and disadvantages of each (from both business and technical 
perspectives), their approximate cost estimates and estimated time frames for 
completion.
(e) The preferred strategy would he identified, including consideration of the required 
IT roles and responsibilities, migration to the target environment, management of 
organisational change, evaluation of progress, performance indicators and critical 
success factors.
(f) The ITSP would he implemented via an IT tactical plan, which would follow the 
strategic directions set by the ITSP, and would consist mainly of plans for proposed 
IT projects.
The main perceived strengths and weaknesses of the current environment were informally 
discussed among the system managers in early 1996. There were some nominated 
weaknesses which some system managers strongly disputed. These included “there is poor 
coordination and integration among the branches and their systems” and “the responsibilities 
for corporate data are not well identified ” Their opposition was based not so much on 
outright disagreement with the statements, as on the perception that they were not really 
relevant. That is, it was not widely felt that poor coordination and integration were in fact 
major weaknesses. The resulting list of deficiencies was restricted to significant perceptions 
common to many systems, such as the fact that many of them were considered not to be 
“user friendly”, their user interfaces were seen as inflexible, and they were seen to have poor 
reporting and enquiry facilities.
The more detailed aspects of the draft ITSP prepared for the Organisation are not relevant 
to this thesis, as the full ITSP document was never shared or discussed beyond the small
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working group which developed it. Before this could happen, the IT manager put the 
process “on hold”, and it was later abandoned by senior management. Moreover within the 
small development group, the IT manager showed little interest in the finer details of the 
ITSP process or the draft plan, preferring to focus on his understanding of “ITSP” as an 
emblem, and focussing even more strongly on his preconceived strategic target, client/server 
computing. The IT manager in fact rejected and overruled the rational approach based on 
the government’s ITSP guidelines in favour of a processual approach to strategy formation 
(e.g. Mintzberg 1994; discussed in section 2.3.2). His approach was based largely on 
intuition and anecdotal information (discussed further in section 3.1.12 below).
The government’s ITSP guidelines fell squarely within the “rational” approach to strategic 
planning (e.g. Ansoflf 1990; see section 2.3.1). A number of criticisms have been made of 
this approach, and of specific aspects of it. For example, the guidelines recommended 
undertaking an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation in relation to 
its mission and goals (Finance 1991: 28-29). However no organisation can be sure whether 
a capability it possesses will prove to be a strength or a weakness over time, because 
“strengths and weaknesses can be detached neither from each other, nor from specific 
contexts, or from the actions to which they are directed” (Mintzberg 1994: 279; discussed 
in section 2.3.1).
Mintzberg (1994: 294-297) also notes that within its typical series of procedural steps, at 
the heart of the process where strategies are supposed to be created, there are often only 
“empty checklists” (as noted in section 2.3.1). This tended to be generally true of the 
government’s guidelines - for example, they recommended developing an IT strategy which:
“ identifies the future business direction;
. sets out how IT will support [it];
. translates that vision into a statement of the way forward in terms of 
information systems, infrastructure, organisation, [and] policies; and
81
IT  Strategic Planning - A Case Study
. sets out the major business benefits....” (Finance 1991:42).
No real insight was offered as to how to overcome the very considerable challenges implicit 
in this simplistic recipe. Mintzberg (1994: 298-303) also criticises the overall analytical 
basis of the rational approach, in which the whole process is reduced to a complex series of 
procedural steps, with a “tendency to substitute mechanics for thought” (see section 2.3.1). 
Rather than being analytical and sequential, successful managerial work is more typically 
simultaneous and holistic (Mintzberg 1994: 319-321). In practice, “The process of strategy 
formation simply has different needs - for creativity and synthesis, which depends on the 
discretion of informed actors. The work of creating strategy cannot be programmed like 
that of shoveling coal” (Mintzberg 1994: 302-303). Again, this criticism applies to the 
government’s guidelines.
The initial phases of the ITSP process in the Organisation were described and analysed in 
this section. These were identified as following the government’s rational guidelines for 
ITSP, which were also criticised. The next two sections outline the nature of the principal 
strategy promoted by the IT manager - client/server computing - and its significance as a 
strategy for the Organisation.
3.7.7.1 Client/server computing
This section consists of a brief summary of client/server computing as a technology per se, 
and its implications in general. The Organisation’s IT manager formulated a personal, 
intuitive vision of client/server computing as the ideal future IT strategy for the 
Organisation, and this is discussed further in section 3.7.7.2.
Client/server is a computing model in which the application processing is partitioned to a 
significant extent across multiple processors, which cooperate to complete the processing 
as a single integrated task (Boar 1993b: 102). A recent study found that 36 of 42 Australian
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public sector organisations surveyed were implementing, or planning to implement 
client/server computing (Finance 1995: 133-136). However client/server is a complex area, 
and there is a large body of related literature. Recent comprehensive studies include 
Adhikari (1994), Boar (1993b) and Finance (1995).
Client/server has emerged as a major paradigm shift in computing in the 1990s. The move 
to client/server may be compared to earlier paradigm shifts in computing, such as the shift 
away from punched cards in the 1960s (Dec 1995a). At that time the alternatives cost more, 
and demanded new techniques, skills and resources. The alternatives prevailed because of 
their superior business value, and today punched cards are rarely seen.
In its simplest form, a client/server computing application consists of components which are 
divided in some way between a “client” and a “server”. Typically, the client and the server 
are separate computers connected via a network (however they need not be). The 
components of a client/server system are co-ordinated by intermediate software (or 
“middleware”) which generally uses remote procedure calls (RPCs) to conduct messages 
between client and server. Client/server systems often utilise an open architecture - that is, 
they are readily portable to other environments. They also often use graphical user 
interfaces. However they need not necessarily have either of these two features (Adhikari 
1994: 5).
The key potential advantages of client/server computing include enhanced productivity and 
effectiveness, enhanced direct control of systems by users, greater flexibility, improved 
access to information, enhanced user interfaces, improved customer service, and improved 
portability and scalability to other environments (Adhikari 1994: 19-20, 63-66; Dec 1995b; 
Finance 1995: 19-38). An important characteristic of a client/server environment is its high 
level of staff participation in most aspects of application systems, including their design, 
operation, maintenance and enhancement. This is generally seen as an advantage, however 
it may not be in some organisational contexts. Many of the benefits of client/server are 
qualitative, and do not lend themselves readily to cost-benefit analysis (e.g. Adhikari 1994:
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127-128; Dec 1996a). This does not necessarily mean that they cannot translate into 
quantifiable gains in the longer term - however these are difficult to predict in advance.
The key potential risks associated with client/server computing as compared with mainframe 
systems have been identified as likely higher costs, increased complexity, reduced security, 
reduced reliability, increased staffing requirements, the need for new skills, increased 
training and limited system management tools. Another significant issue can be unrealistic 
expectations of client/server on the part of employees, and the management of such 
expectations (Adhikari 1994: 20-28; Finance 1995: 39-82).
The costs of client/server versus traditional mainframe-based approaches is a contentious 
and inconclusive area, with few hard facts. The weight of available evidence suggests that 
in monetary terms client/server costs significantly more than mainframe, at least in the earlier 
stages (Dec 1995a; Finance 1995). However no fully controlled comparisons have been 
made. It is widely held that the business drivers of client/server are factors such as 
productivity and flexibility, not direct cost reduction - and that it can be difficult to quantify 
the benefits initially (e g. Adhikari 1994; Dec 1996a). Organisations contemplating 
client/server usually aim to balance the likelihood of increased costs in the short term against 
the potential business benefits in the long term.
Client/server systems are likely to be more complex than the equivalent mainframe-based 
systems, because a greater number and diversity of components interact with each other - 
usually across a network, which can add another level of complexity (e.g. Adhikari 1994: 
26). Interfaces among systems are also likely to be more complex. Proper management of 
the client/server environment is therefore crucial, including all interfaces among systems. 
Early success with a relatively simple pilot project runs a risk of leading to “short cuts” 
being taken - but this can increase the risk of failure later on as more complex projects are 
undertaken (Williams 1995).
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The technical skills and competencies required for systems development, maintenance and 
management in a client/server environment are considerably different from those needed for 
a mainframe environment, although many of the mainframe disciplines remain essential 
(Adhikari 1994: 24-25). In one survey, over 50 per cent of respondents cited “lack of 
qualified personnel” as their major obstacle to implementing client/server.
Client/server computing in general, and its potential benefits and risks, were outlined in this 
section. The next section examines the implications of client/server as a short-lived strategy 
of the Organisation.
3.7.7.2 Client/server computing as an Organisation strategy
This section describes and analyses the key strategy proposed and promoted by the IT 
manager - client/server computing - and its implications within the Organisation. The 
concepts of symbolism and the processual approach to strategic planning (introduced in Part 
2) are applied as necessary, to assist interpretation.
In 1995 the IT manager had been sent by the Organisation on an overseas tour to study the 
approaches to IT taken by other organisations. He provided feedback to the CIO after these 
visits. In some such cases it appeared that the organisation had successfully migrated, or 
was successfully migrating its information systems to a client/server environment. As a 
result the IT manager developed a personal conviction that client/server computing should 
form a major part of the future IT environment of the Organisation, and that this would 
confer significant advantages. However the IT manager did not investigate in any detail the 
pre-existing structure, functions or systems of the other organisations, or the actual nature 
of their “client/server” migrations. Their situations may not have been comparable to that 
o f the Organisation, and their solutions may not have been directly transferable to the 
Organisation.
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The IT manager based his understanding of “client/server computing” largely on his personal 
experience and intuition. He did not apparently refer to the literature to broaden his 
understanding of the concept (e.g. Finance 1995, 1996). He also did not discuss the topic 
in any depth within the IT section, and moved to block any organised discussion of it by the 
system managers by preventing their meeting formally, after they had shown signs of 
questioning the proposed strategy.
The client/server strategy as formulated by the IT manager, although deliberate, fell within 
the processual school of strategic planning (e.g. Mintzberg 1978, 1994; see section 2.3.2), 
to the extent that it was subjective and intuitive, and based on qualitative and anecdotal 
information. The IT manager in fact chose to circumvent the rational approach originally 
adopted by the small ITSP working group, and replace it with a deliberate, single-minded 
goal of achieving a migration to a client/server environment.
For his part, the IT manager often manipulated “client/server computing” as a private 
symbol or emblem (e.g. Firth 1973; see section 2.4.2). He had only limited technical 
understanding of the issues involved in client/server computing. For example, he apparently 
thought that mere “migration” of the existing information systems to “client/server”, without 
change to their functionality, would somehow act to overcome many of the considerable 
deficiencies of the systems. This specifically included overcoming the poor access to 
information both within and across the systems, the high costs of maintenance and the lack 
of “user friendliness” of the systems.
The IT manager’s interpretation of “migration to client/server” in fact simply entailed 
“conversion” of the systems to Oracle relational database management systems, running on 
local midrange computers within the Organisation. From sources in other organisations he 
had formed a conviction that automated means were available to convert the existing 
mainframe-based, non-relational database systems to relational systems which would run on 
midrange computers. Despite this being investigated by Central IT, it was not fully 
confirmed, and remained in some doubt until the ITSP process was terminated, and it had
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little further relevance. Certainly in the two cases of “migration to client/server” which the 
IT manager was able to initiate, there was no automated conversion, but rather full 
redevelopment of the systems was commenced in Oracle on the mainframe.
One system manager said of the IT manager’s views, “He sees ‘client/server’ as some kind 
of silver bullet which will solve all our problems in one fell swoop - unfortunately it’s not 
as simple as that. He’s only acting on a hunch.” For the IT manager, when he referred to 
“the ITSP” he also focussed strongly by implication on his proposed strategy - migration to 
client/server - and he used reference to “ITSP” as a means of promoting his vision. When 
the IT manager referred to “client/server” in discourse he implied all of the connotations of 
“ITSP” as an emblem (as noted in section 3.7.7), plus certain additional connotations of 
“client/server computing” as an emblem, which included:
. greatly enhanced access to information by the Organisation’s users and managers;
. greatly enhanced “user friendliness” of the Organisation’s information systems;
. greater independence and control by the Organisation over its own information
systems;
. freedom from the perceived restrictions of the parent department’s mainframe;
. reduction of the perceived high costs of services provided by Central IT;
. freedom from the perceived substandard services provided by Central IT; and
. improved reliability and responsiveness by elimination of reliance on the
telecommunications link to the parent department’s mainframe.
The IT manager often emphasised an alleged unreliability and lack of responsiveness of the 
telecommunications link. However the system manager who had the most direct 
involvement with the link maintained that there were few problems, and that the relevant 
telecommunications reports demonstrated this. At best this issue remained inconclusive.
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Many of the system managers had serious doubts about the potential value of client/server 
computing per se, and some believed that although client/server might confer some benefits, 
the costs would be likely to be excessive. This last view was also held by some influential 
managers in Central IT. Many of the system managers therefore developed their own 
understandings and connotations of “client/server computing” as an emblem. All of these 
were seen by them in a negative light, and collectively they included:
. the likelihood of a greater concentration of power in the IT section and the General 
Services branch, and specifically in the person of the IT manager;
. the likelihood of greater ongoing costs;
. the likelihood of greater complexity in the IT environment;
. the likelihood of reduced reliability of the Organisation’s information systems;
. the likelihood of reduced security in the IT environment; and
. the likelihood of increased responsibility and work for the system managers, without 
any additional resources or training.
The negative connotations of “client/server computing” were also linked by association by 
these system managers to “IT strategic planning”, as it was applied within the Organisation. 
That is, in many ways the referents of “client/server computing” and “IT strategic planning” 
as emblems, as understood by many system managers, were diametrically opposed to the 
understandings of the IT manager.
The two sections above have described client/server computing in general, and drawn out 
its implications as an Organisation strategy as promoted by the IT manager. In the light of 
this discussion, the next section continues the examination of the ITSP process in the 
Organisation (commenced earlier).
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3.7.7.3 Further development of the IT strategic plan
This section discusses and analyses the continued attempt to develop a client/server-based 
ITSP for the Organisation. The theoretical concepts of organisational culture and IT 
governance (introduced in Part 2) are applied as necessary, to enhance interpretation.
Initially the IT manager aimed to involve the system managers in the ITSP process, as he 
perceived that their support would assist in gaining acceptance within the Organisation for 
his proposed strategy. Within the organisational culture and also within the IT governance 
framework, it was legitimate to discuss and decide issues within small, expert groups. The 
IT manager therefore chose to hold a one-day workshop session with some key stakeholders 
to accelerate the process of developing the ITSP. These included the system managers, 
representatives of a few business units and staff from Central IT. Selected discussion papers 
were sent to attendees in advance of the workshop. These included summaries of the main 
information systems, the advantages and disadvantages of the current systems environment 
as perceived by the IT manager and some reviews of client/server computing.
Despite the fact that the IT strategic planning process could not reasonably be expected to 
develop in one day complete and effective IT strategies for the Organisation, the IT manager 
nevertheless insisted that the workshop should discuss the details of a migration to 
client/server - which should logically have been a later phase of the ITSP process. 
Accordingly the stated aim of the workshop was that a first draft of the ITSP should result 
from it, and this was supported by the CIO. The workshop agenda therefore originally 
aimed to follow an ambitious pattern which conformed to the government’s ITSP guidelines 
(Finance 1991), including full discussion of the following stages (as noted in section 3.7.7):
. Where are we now?
. What's good and bad about it?
. Where should we go, and why?
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How do we get there?
In fact, the IT manager had little interest in the first two, but wanted to focus as soon as 
possible on his proposed client/server strategy. The earlier sessions of the workshop 
included an overview of the government’s ITSP guidelines. The workshop followed the set 
agenda for only about its first half, reaching the point of starting to discuss, “Where should 
we go, and why?” At this point it became apparent that there was a strong current of 
opinion among system managers to the effect that the highest priority should be to first 
identify the key business requirements of the Organisation. Only after these were identified 
should technical solutions be considered. The representatives of Central IT also supported 
this view, and the IT manager’s opinion to the contrary received no support.
It was then acknowledged that although various documents did exist which addressed the 
Organisation’s business requirements (including the “strategic management plan” of 1994 
and the few existing business plans), there was no document available which defined the 
business needs in a form readily suited to identifying IT solutions. It was accordingly agreed 
that the latter half of the workshop should be devoted to a discussion of key business needs, 
with a view to their implementation via IT methods.
After the workshop, a record of it was distributed to attendees for their review. The 
feedback on this from system managers included the comments:
“We are wasting our time.... focussing on parts of the solution e.g. client/server. 
Instead we need to focus on determining what our business requirements are, and 
then how systems can help achieve these.”
“System managers together with their respective users and branch directors need to 
establish the business requirements for each system/fiinction undertaken, with a view 
to developing business cases to justify enhancements or redevelopments. It should 
then be [Central IT’s] responsibility to propose technical solutions.”
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The comments reflected the prevailing view that business requirements could and should be 
determined for each existing function and system individually. The alternative, not widely 
supported, would be to adopt a top-down approach to identifying functional business 
requirements, across the boundaries of existing branches and systems.
Nevertheless it became apparent that some of the system managers wanted to discuss the 
proposed client/server strategy in depth, and the technical justification for it. However at 
this stage the IT manager moved to prevent as far as possible their subsequent meeting as 
a group, and later moved to block their further involvement in the ITSP process itself. The 
system managers never again met as a full group during the study.
The subsequent compromise process agreed between the IT manager and the CIO was that 
a draft statement of the Organisation’s key business requirements would be prepared, based 
as far as possible on the workshop’s output. This document would then be distributed for 
discussion to the system managers, followed by the branch directors and section managers. 
The document would then be expanded to define the desired target environment and 
strategies for reaching it.
The small ITSP working group of three then took on the task of documenting the 
Organisation’s business needs. An initial draft statement was prepared, focussing in 
particular on aspects which would most need to be considered in the future IS environment. 
The IT manager deliberately sought to emphasise business needs which were understood to 
be capable ofbeing met by client/server computing (see section 3.7.7.1). For example, the 
document highlighted the need to improve efficiency, increase the level of control over 
systems by users, improve access to information and enhance the user interfaces. The draft 
statement was distributed for review to the system managers in mid-1996. Only a few minor 
comments were received and the draft was updated accordingly.
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The draft statement of business needs was then distributed to the branch directors and the 
section managers. A covering note added that it was intended that an ITSP would be 
developed based on the business needs, and that the ITSP would be implemented via an IT 
tactical plan. The latter would include requirements for individual IT projects.
As a result, only one set of comments was made and circulated to all managers, from a 
section manager who would shortly replace the CIO as director of General Services branch 
(and thereby become the IT manager’s supervisor). The comments included:
“The aim should be to... set out the strategies and activities... e.g. ‘one of the 
strategies for (re)development of any system is to identify the business rules which 
apply to the particular system on which the work is being undertaken’.”
The comment in general reflected the widespread view that the only real action in support 
o f the Organisation’s objectives occurred at the branch and system level. This in fact 
reflected the prevailing view within the implicit IT governance framework and the 
organisational culture.
The IT manager responded to the effect that (and this was also copied to all managers):
“The overall IT strategic planning process is in accordance with government 
guidelines for ITSP, entitled 'Developing a business driven IT strategy'.... This is 
regarded as the best means of achieving a co-ordinated approach to meeting the 
[Organisation’s] corporate IT needs for the future, as opposed to potentially 
inconsistent local actions involving individual systems and units. The IT strategic 
planning process aims to support the corporate business objectives....”
This response and the ITSP process in general were apparently perceived as a threat to the 
autonomy of the branches, as shown further below. Both system and business managers had 
been explicitly promised that they would be consulted during the development of the ITSP. 
This did occur to the limited extent that they were invited to comment on the draft “business
92
IT Strategic Planning - A Case Study
requirements” document. However they responded only sparingly, to some extent because 
they were unaccustomed to being consulted. After this the IT manager chose to block any 
further consultation. Because they had been promised further involvement, some managers 
resented the fact that it was not forthcoming. However within the prevailing norms of the 
organisational culture, wide consultation and participative decision-making were rare, and 
generally seen not so much as being inappropriate, but simply being not relevant within the 
Organisation (as discussed in section 3.3).
The ITSP process was debated at the next branch directors’ meeting, and resulted in 
acrimonious disagreement. One director took up the criticisms made by his section manager 
(as summarised above), and embellished on them in the form of an attack on the credibility 
of the IT manager. He argued for the termination of the corporate ITSP process, and for 
the reinstatement of the previous situation in which each branch had the primary 
responsibility for planning its own IT functions and services. The CIO vigorously countered 
this attack, and strongly argued for the retention of the corporate process.
A draft full ITSP was then prepared by the working group in the same manner as the earlier 
“business requirements” document. The full ITSP aimed to cover all aspects of information, 
information management, information architecture, information systems, IT and 
telecommunications. The plan aimed to support the business strategies and directions of the 
Organisation and the parent department, to complement the IT strategies of the parent 
department, to enable business improvements and to reflect government policies. The ITSP 
was intended to cover five financial years. Although the full ITSP aimed to respond to key 
business requirements, it was noted in the plan that the process entailed a constructive 
partnership between IT and business.
However before the draft full ITSP could be distributed to any other employees or 
stakeholders for review, the ITSP project was temporarily suspended by the IT manager - 
partly due to the rising level of negative criticism of it, and partly due to uncertainty 
surrounding a downsizing of the Organisation (discussed in section 3.7.7.4). Nevertheless
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the IT manager continued specifying to Central IT that certain further systems were to be 
“converted to client/server”, and attempted to reach agreement with them in terms of 
required resources and timetables.
The sections above described and analysed the overall ITSP process in the Organisation, 
including the significance of the principal strategy proposed by the IT manager, client/server 
computing. The ultimate outcomes of the ITSP process are described in the next section.
3.7.7.4 Outcomes of the IT strategic planning process
This section discusses the final outcomes of the various sets of understandings and events 
which made up the overall ITSP process within the Organisation. The concepts of IT 
governance and organisational culture (introduced in Part 2) are utilised as appropriate.
The IT manager made a number of submissions to the next branch directors’ meeting. 
These included a unilateral assessment of the state of the Organisation’s information 
systems, which had not been developed in consultation with the system managers. It 
included adverse criticism of some of the systems, and of their management. Another 
submission strongly recommended the reinstatement of the Linkages project (section 3.7.6), 
to the effect that, “It is a severe weakness in our systems.... Whilst it remains not 
implemented, major inefficiencies will continue in the systems.... It is recommended that 
[Linkages] resume upon migration of our core systems to client/server.” These submissions 
were circulated to the branch directors a few days before the meeting, and they asked their 
system managers for their opinions. There was disagreement with and criticism of the 
submissions. By this stage, there was apparently little objective examination of their 
content, and the strongest criticism centred on the IT manager’s perceived lack of 
experience and his autocratic and one-sided approach. A furore resulted, and again the 
directors’ meeting was given over to acrimonious argument.
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The IT manager had sought to deny the system managers formal power by preventing their 
assembling as an effective group, but he was unable to influence the informal power which 
they possessed within the context of the implicit IT governance and the organisational 
culture - and they used this to good effect to terminate the ITSP process. The ITSP process 
was ultimately rejected by the Organisation’s system managers (in particular), largely 
because by this time the IT manager was widely believed to be operating beyond the limits 
of his expertise. In terms of the values of the prevailing organisational culture (section 3.3), 
this was seen as unacceptable - he had gone too far.
In early 1996 the CEO of the parent department had advised all staff that due to government 
budget measures, there would be a reduction in staffing of around ten per cent, and that 
farther reductions were likely. Senior managers were asked to undertake reviews in their 
areas, aimed at “identifying procedures and functions which can be rationalised so as to 
require less staff support.” It was advised that it was intended that the reductions would be 
achieved as far as possible through natural attrition, voluntary redundancy and redeployment 
of staff.
A new CEO was appointed to the Organisation in 1996, and it was later announced that the 
CIO would be included in the redundancies, along with some other managers. The IT 
manager responded to these developments in part by putting the ITSP process “on hold” 
indefinitely. However he deliberately encouraged the continuation of what he referred to 
as “migration to client/server” (that is, the redevelopment of some systems in Oracle). But 
by late 1996 the IT manager himself was relieved of his IT responsibilities and transferred 
elsewhere. One employee commented, “I believe that he brought it on himself. He’s 
worked with most of the other branches. He had the chance to build bridges with every one 
of them, but he burnt them all.”
It became clear at that point that the ITSP process within the Organisation was terminated. 
Although from an external perspective the process might be regarded as a “failure”, the 
actual outcomes were logical and made sense to most participants within the specific context
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of the Organisation. In fact, from their perspective the overturning of the client/server 
strategy was a successful result. The reasons for this lay primarily within the precepts of the 
IT governance and the organisational culture (see sections 3.3 and 3.7.2).
The sections above described and critically analysed the various perceptions and behaviours 
which constituted the IT strategic planning process in the Organisation. The next section 
provides an overview and appraisal of the case study as a whole.
3.8 Review of case study
This section consists of an overall review and assessment of the case study. It summarises 
the most significant features of the case study and provides analytical comments on them, 
including some inferences not previously discussed. The review explicitly draws on the 
relevant theoretical approaches and areas of literature introduced in Part 2.
The research method used the principal field technique of cultural anthropology, participant 
observation (e.g. Spradley 1980; see sections 2.4.3 and 3.2). A key anthropological 
concept, organisational culture, was introduced and investigated to help elucidate the ITSP 
process (e.g. Duncan 1995; sections 2.4.1 and 3.3). The case study aimed to investigate the 
structures, processes and values which applied within the Organisation, focussing on the 
questions:
. Why was ITSP undertaken by the Organisation?
. How was it attempted?
. How and why was it opposed?
. Why did it apparently fail?
The ITSP process was instigated largely as a perceived need following an earlier corporate 
strategic planning process, which created impetus for the Organisation to develop its own 
corresponding IT strategic plan. In addition, there was rising dissatisfaction within the
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Organisation over the perceived deficiencies of its information systems, of the delivery of 
IT services by the Central IT division, and of the earlier ITSP produced by Central IT (see 
section 3.7.7).
The Organisation’s ITSP process first attempted to follow a rational approach (e.g. AnsofF 
1990; section 2.3.1), based on the government’s ITSP guidelines (Finance 1991; section 
3.7.7). Mintzberg (1994: 213) suggests that rational planning is often undertaken by an 
organisation in order to create an illusion of control over its problems, without actually 
solving them. If the organisation plans formally, the argument goes, all will be well. 
Governments in particular are prone to this illusion of control, and often impose formal 
planning processes on their agencies. The cases of both the Organisation and the wider 
government context illustrate this point.
The IT manager overruled the initial rational ITSP approach in favour of an intuitive, highly 
focussed client/server strategy which fell within the processual school of strategic planning, 
and was based more on soft, anecdotal information (e.g. Mintzberg 1994; sections 2.3.2 and 
3.1.1.2). In the terms of the processual school, this strategy might in fact have been 
successful. However its weakness was that it was not “intuitive” in a way which was 
acceptable within the precepts of the implicit IT governance and the organisational culture - 
it was not based on acknowledged substantial IT experience, and it failed to complement or 
reinforce the existing strong functional autonomy of organisational units (see sections
3.1.1.3 and 3.7.7.4).
Because the basic values of the scientific culture of the Organisation were deep-seated and 
long-established, they were highly resistant to change (section 3.3). The implicit ground 
rules of the IT governance framework were similarly resistant to change, especially as 
regards the autonomy of organisational units and their independence in IT decision-making 
(section 3.7.2). The IT manager’s technocratic style of decision-making was in keeping with 
his absorption of the prevailing organisational culture. Employees understood that he was 
attempting to impose an arbitrary decision. In itself this might not have been questioned -
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it was after all the way things were often done in the Organisation. However certainly in 
regard to client/server computing, the system managers eventually believed that he was 
operating outside his range of expertise. In this case there was little perceived expert 
knowledge supporting the proposed strategy, and moreover virtually all discussion of it had 
been thwarted by the IT manager (section 3.7.7.3).
The technocratic attempt by the IT manager to impose client/server computing was 
therefore opposed, and ultimately overcome - largely by the principal “carriers” of the 
implicit IT governance, the system managers (section 3.7.7.4). The approach of the system 
managers was soundly based within both the implicit IT governance and the organisational 
culture. As seen through the lens of the processual model of strategic planning, this was an 
emergent IT strategy (e.g. Mintzberg 1994; section 2.3.2). In effect, the system managers 
re-asserted the dominant implicit strategy - based on the autonomy of organisational units, 
which formed a key aspect of the organisational culture. In terms of the model presented 
in Diagram 2 (in Part 2), the structure and culture of the Organisation shaped its actual IT 
governance and IT strategy. These in turn reinforced the principles of the organisational 
culture and structure.
The behaviour of the IT manager leading up to his transfer could perhaps be seen from an 
external stance as illogical and even self-destructive. However from within the perspective 
of the organisational culture, it was logical and made sense. The IT manager operated in 
the technocratic manner he believed to be proper within the prevailing culture and the 
implicit IT governance framework. The fact that he did not have abundant technical 
knowledge or experience was not a conscious factor in his actions, from his perspective. 
In many ways he was an unwitting victim of the situation.
One irony is that a different person as IT manager, with stronger acknowledged IT 
experience and qualifications, might have formulated a similar ITSP proposal - including a 
client/server strategy - and had it endorsed and implemented. The system managers and 
business managers might well have accepted technocratic decision-making from someone
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whom they perceived to have greater legitimacy, that is, whose pronouncements were 
believed to be backed up by substantial technical knowledge.
This section reviewed the key features of the case study and provided critical reflections on 
them. Part 4 provides a conclusion to the thesis as a whole, including comments on the 
overall results of the research project 
future studies of IT strategic planning
and the fulfilment of its aims. Some inferences for 
processes are also drawn.
99
IT  Strategic Planning - A Case Study
PART 4 
Conclusion
This thesis is a detailed study of the first attempt by a certain public sector organisation to 
follow a formal ITSP process. The main aim was to interpret the ITSP process as it actually 
operated within that organisation. A subsidiary aim was to contribute to a better 
understanding of the ITSP process in general. It was recognised that there are two broad 
approaches to strategic planning - “rational” and “processual” (see Part 2). The rational 
approach usually entails a logical, top-down, analytical approach (e.g. Ansoff 1990). The 
processual approach acknowledges that strategies can also emerge from a complex 
foundation of cultural and social factors (e.g. Mintzberg 1994). In the processual model, 
strategy formation can make good use of soft information, often drawn from the “grass 
roots” of the organisation.
The main conclusion of the thesis is that the overall ITSP process in the Organisation can 
be best understood not as a rational process, but as an emergent strategy which was shaped 
by the cultural understandings which applied at the “grass roots” (see Part 3). It was shown 
that the ITSP process was shaped by the IT governance framework which applied within 
the Organisation. In this respect the most significant aspects of the IT governance 
framework were its implicit, as opposed to its explicit aspects. It was demonstrated that the 
implicit IT governance framework was itself substantially influenced by key factors 
associated with the organisational culture and structure (e.g. section 3.7.2). One such factor 
was the high level of autonomy of organisational units, which was a significant feature of 
both the IT governance and the internal culture. It was also shown that the nature of the 
Organisation’s information systems represented an ongoing emergent strategy which was 
shaped by the IT governance and the organisational culture (e.g. section 3.7.3). The 
management of the information systems also constituted a major component of the IT 
governance, and it was shown that this also clearly reflected the autonomy of organisational
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units. It was demonstrated that the organisational culture itself was significantly influenced 
by the structure and history of the Organisation (e.g. section 3.3).
It was concluded that although the specific ITSP approach which formed the main subject 
o f the case study might be seen as a “failure” in a sense, the overall outcome appeared 
logical to most participants, in the light of the perceived principles of the IT governance 
framework and the organisational culture (e.g. section 3.8). The ITSP approach of the case 
study initially attempted to follow a rational direction based on governmental guidelines. 
This was subsequently overruled by a certain manager (the IT manager) in favour of an 
intuitive, unilateral ITSP approach falling within the processual school, aimed at achieving 
a certain objective - namely a migration to a client/server environment (e.g. section 3.7.7.3). 
This approach was in turn seen by many participants as not being in accord with key values 
of the organisational culture, largely because the main proponent was perceived as lacking 
the necessary credibility to act in a “technocratic” manner. The approach was also seen as 
a threat to the autonomy of organisational units, and therefore not in harmony with the 
principles of either the implicit IT governance or the organisational structure. The approach 
was therefore overturned by certain major players (the system managers) within the IT 
governance framework - so reinstating key precepts of the implicit IT governance (e.g. 
section 3.7.7.4). The ultimate outcome constituted an overall emergent IT strategy, which 
effectively reinforced the values of the organisational culture.
The mutual influences within the triad comprising organisational history, structure and 
culture, and the ways in which these factors can in general shape another triad comprising 
IT governance, information systems and IT strategy were discussed in Part 2 and 
summarised in Diagram 2. Also discussed were the ways in which IT governance, 
information systems and IT strategy can mutually influence one another, and reinforce the 
premises of the organisational culture and structure. It was shown that this model applied 
within the organisational context studied (e.g. section 3.8).
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A number of writers have sought to identify or categorise various organisational 
characteristics which may be associated with particular forms of IT strategy formation (e.g. 
Earl 1989: 40-61; Harm and Weber 1996). However while acknowledging that there is 
considerable variation among organisations, these approaches tend to assume that there is 
a common, shared understanding across organisations of the basic meanings of the terms “IT 
strategy” and “IT strategic planning”, even if the planning methods and the details of the 
adopted strategies may vary.
It was concluded that in the context of the Organisation at least, the terms “IT strategy” and 
“ITSP” were imprecise concepts, with no unambiguous meanings in their own right. The 
concept “ITSP” possessed connotations which varied among different players in the 
Organisation (see Part 3). For example, the IT manager and the group of system managers 
held diametrically opposed understandings of “ITSP” as an emblem (see section 3.7.7.2). 
In this respect “ITSP” was a convenient label or emblem which was applied by different 
parties to represent their own particular understandings and interpretations.
In terms of the subsidiary aim of contributing to a better understanding of the ITSP process 
in general, it can be inferred that a hypothetical survey of ITSP across many target 
organisations would be unlikely to obtain meaningful data from the Organisation, if it did 
not include detailed observation. The ITSP process within the Organisation was complex, 
multi-faceted and rapidly changing. In the words of Geertz (1973), it comprised “a 
multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them superimposed upon or knotted 
into one another.... at once strange, irregular and inexplicit” (Geertz 1973: 9-10). 
Depending on which employee was questioned and at what time, the conjectured researcher 
might be variously informed that the Organisation did not undertake ITSP, that it undertook 
it on a top-down basis, that it undertook it on an individual branch basis, that the ITSP 
process was or was not successful, that there was or was not an IT steering committee, and 
so on. By inference this situation might also apply in other organisations, and this could 
possibly call into question the validity of some wide-ranging surveys of IT strategic
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planning.
It is concluded that the principal focus of an inquiry should in the first instance be a detailed 
study of the values and processes applying within an organisation, including the nature of 
its information systems and IT governance - avoiding an attempt to focus primarily on an 
imprecise concept such as IT strategic planning. It is also concluded that because the 
concept “IT strategic planning” does not have a single, commonly accepted definition, it is 
not yet possible to compare it meaningfully across organisations in the same way that, for 
example, a well understood concept such as “financial management” can be compared. This 
implies the need to accumulate a greater number of detailed studies of the IT strategic 
planning processes and understandings which actually occur within many different 
organisations. In this way comparative studies of IT strategic planning across organisations 
will in time yield more valid and valuable results.
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- internal 1996
- external 1996
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IT strategic planning
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Memoranda
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- from managers
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- general
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- political leaders
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- managers
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